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A. Z. Handford, a Negro, was tried in the Thomasville Division of
the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on a one-count indict-
ment for illegal possession of nontaxpaid whiskey, in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 5008(b)(1) and § 5642. He was found guilty and sentenced to
two years imprisonment.
Appellant specifies as errors: '(1) the evidence does not support the
verdict, and the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been
granted; (2) because of the prejudicial and inflammatory argument of the
district attorney, a new trial should be granted.' The alleged 'prejudicial
and inflammatory argument' consisted of (a) an appeal to racial prejudice
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I would like to thank my research
assistant, Madeline Cohen, for her help and, of course, the Wisdoms for their continuing
inspiration.
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and (b) argument that too many of the prosecutor's friends and friends'
children get run over up and down the highways.
A United States district attorney carries a double burden. He owes
an obligation to the government, just as any attorney owes an obligation
to his client, to conduct his case zealously. But he must remember also
that he is the representative of a government dedicated to fairness and
equal justice to all and, in this respect, he owes a heavy obligation to the
accused. Such representation imposes an overriding obligation of fairness
so important that Anglo-American criminal law rests on the foundation:
better the guilty escape than the innocent suffer. In this case zeal outran
fairness. The argument of the United States attorney in the district court
was improper, prejudicial, and constituted reversible error.'
With these words, released on November 13, 1957, John Minor Wis-.
dom began one of America's outstanding judicial careers. Since that time,
he has written nearly 1,400 signed, published opinions, published over a
span of more than 800 of the 1300 volumes of the Federal Reporter. It is
fitting that the first page of his first published opinion sounded themes that
have featured prominently in those opinions: fairness, equal justice, and, so
often, the problems of race.
Judge Wisdom's judicial career now sits in my computer. My com-
puter's hard drive contains every published judicial opinion he has signed,
from November 13, 1957 through the end of 1995, along with records of the
citations to his opinions by the courts and law review articles. Such a distin-
guished career is not easily compassed - it consumes about 60 megabytes
of memory: But it is all there.
Of course, it is not really there. Virtual reality is not reality. My care-
fully constructed, computerized record of Judge Wisdom's career is a color-
less and distorted reflection of the real career, the real judge, and the real
man. The career is a model of hard work, intelligence, and courage - in
practice, in politics, and on the federal bench. The judge is a Solomon
equipped with rigorous analysis, profound scholarship, and sparkling prose.
The man, with his kindness, humor, and humanity, is an inspiration. Judge
Wisdom and his indispensable partner, Bonnie Wisdom, have been parents,
uncle and aunt, grandparents, advisors, and friends to more than ninety law
clerks now, including, to my great good fortune, myself. Like them all, I
am honored to have known the Wisdoms. My computer knows nothing of
these things.
But can my computer help us learn anything new and interesting about
his real career? I believe it can.
1. United States v. Handford, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1957) (footnote omitted).
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OFA JUDICIAL CAREER
This article explores the kinds of questions about judicial careers we can
approach by using computer data-bases, with the opinions that make up
Judge Wisdom's career as a "case" study. Specifically, I have downloaded
full-text versions of all of Judge Wisdom's roughly 1400 reported opinions2
and have searched judicial opinion citators and law review databases for
citations to those opinions. I searched the full text opinions for certain
trends in his writing; I examined the citations for evidence of his influence.
I conclude that these kinds of analyses can tell us some things about judges.
The analysis of citations, in particular, has value for indicating the impor-
tance of a judge's reported decisions relative to each other and the influence
of his opinions over time. These methods also have some limited value in
indicating the relative influence of one judge compared to other judges.
The first section of this article describes quantitative analysis of publica-
tions, in general and then as it has been applied to legal materials. The
second section provides basic information about Judge Wisdom's opinions.
The third section analyzes some aspects of his opinions, notably his use of
separate opinions, the length of his opinions, and his use of footnotes. These
three areas are examined both over time within his own career and by com-
parisons with other judges. The fourth section analyzes citations to Judge
Wisdom's opinions, once again both over time and compared with those of
other judges. The article ends by offering a preliminary assessment of the
usefulness of these kinds of research techniques.
This article serves both as an unusual contribution to the history of
Judge Wisdom's career and, more generally, as an exploration of the uses
of new technology. Almost everything done here could have been done
through an exhaustive examination of more than 800 volumes of the Federal
Reporter, second and third series; scores of volumes of the Federal Supple-
ment, and careful use of Shepard's Citations. Computers have made this
kind of work easier, although they have not made it easy or free from the
need for judgment. The article ends with an appendix describing the meth-
ods I used in these analyses, to allow an assessment of this work and to offer
help to anyone else who chooses to use these methods.
L The Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Opinions
There has been little effort to analyze a judge's opinions quantitatively.
The pioneering effort, and still the leader, is Judge Richard Posner's Car-
2. These are the opinions found in the Lexis "Genfed" library as of the end of 1995
with a search of "written by (Wisdom)", with a few unpublished opinions and a few mistakes
in attribution removed.
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dozo: A Study in Reputation.3 But quantitative analysis of the influence of
publications has been employed in other contexts, particularly through
citation analysis.
In one sense, lawyers pioneered citation analysis. The first index to
citations was the Shepard's Citation System, begun by Frank Shepard in
1873.1 The Shepard's system is a methodical listing and partial description
of all citations to published American judicial opinions, and to certain other
authorities, found in judicial opinions and some other publications. Shep-
ard's thrived because lawyers found it useful for two reasons. They could
use it to determine whether precedents they relied upon had been overruled
or discredited. They could also use it to search for extensions of the reason-
ing of earlier cases or for cases that presented factual or legal issues similar
to the first case. "Shepardizing" has become sufficiently important that the
use of the Shepard's system has long been one of the first aspects of the
"legal method" taught to law students.
Legal citations were very early used by scholars as well as practitioners.
According to Professor Shapiro, the first known analysis of the frequency
of particular kinds of citations was an 1894 analysis of judicial citations to
different authorities, which was followed quickly by a more extensive study
in 1895.' But since then, very little has been done to use that information
quantitatively to reveal information about the opinions. Other fields, more
quantitatively inclined than the law, have not been as reluctant.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the scientific community began to
create its own citation indexes. Three journals created citation indexes to
their volumes and a consulting firm called Eugene Garfield Associates
created a citation index to more than 5,000 chemical patents. In 1961, the
consulting firm, transformed into a business named the Institute for Scientific
Information ("ISI"), created a pilot citation index for genetics, the 1961
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990). Judge Posner's
leading position will be challenged by an extensive study of citations to federal circuit judges,
soon to be published. See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, & Michael E. Solimine,
Judicial Reputation: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming June 1996), which the authors were kind enough to share with me as I was
completing this article. See infra note 35. Posner's work was preceded by one shorter effort
that used citations to measure individual judicial influence, Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most
Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 481 (1983).
4. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1540 (1985)
[hereinafter Shapiro 1]. This study was later somewhat revised and enlarged and published
along with the law review articles it designated. FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE MOST-CITED LAw
REvmw ARTICLES (1987).
5. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE
L.J. 1449, 1455 (1991) [hereinafter Shapiro 11].
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Genetics Citation Index, with financial support from the National Institute
of Health. ISI was encouraged by the result, but the federal government
rejected its request for further funding for a broader scientific index. So,
beginning in 1964, ISI began publishing its own annual Science Citation
Index. The index was a success and was followed by the Social Sciences
Citation Index in 1973 and the Humanities Citation Index in 1978.6
The inspiration for these systems was, like the inspiration for Shepard's,
an effort to trace ideas through succeeding publications. But, particularly in
the natural sciences, the resulting lists of citations came to be used not just
as an index but as data about the "value" of individual articles, scholars, and
entire university departments. As citation analysis has come to affect the
careers of individual researchers - including what jobs they get or keep -
it has become controversial, but it continues to be used widely.7
By contrast, the legal world has put little effort into the quantitative
analysis of publications or citations. Three very different kinds of analyses
occasionally have been published: assessments of how particular courts have
used authorities, lists of the most frequently cited publications, and assess-
ments of the scholarly qualities of particular law school faculties.
The oldest and largest of these efforts is a continuing stream of scholar-
ship examining what authorities different courts have relied upon during
different periods. Professor John Henry Merryman performed perhaps the
earliest rigorous assessment in 1954, when he looked at the authorities cited
by the California Supreme Court in 1950.8 Merryman returned to this anal-
ysis more than twenty years later, comparing that court's citation practices
6. See the historical discussion in EUGENE GARFIELD, CITATION INDEXING - ITS
THEORY AND APPLICATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMANITIEs 6-16 (1979). This
history is summarized in Shapiro I, supra note 4, at 1541. Readers should note that Garfield
is the founder of the Institute for Scientific Information, which is in business to produce these
indexes.
7. Citation analysis has itself been studied for its significance and "value." See, e.g.,
JONATHAN R. COLE & STEPHEN COLE, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE 35 (1973);
EUGENE GARFIELD, ESSAYS OF AN INFORMATION SCIENTIST 337-47 (1980); Jonathan R. Cole
& Stephen Cole, Measuring the Quality of Sociological Research: Problems in the Use of the
Science Citation Index, 6 AM. Soc. 23, 23-24 (1971); Jonathan R. Cole & Stephen Cole,
Scientific Output and Recognition: A Study in the Operation of the Reward System in Science,
32 AM. SOC. REV. 377 (1967); Emilie C. White, Bibliometrics: From Curiosity to Conven-
tion, 76 SPECIAL LIR. at 35, 39-40 (1985). Garfield provided a general summary of the
criticisms and a defense of the technique in CITATION INDEXING - ITS THEORY AND APPLI-
CATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMANITIES. See GARFIELD, supra note 6.
8. John H. Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613 (1954). The empirical study is located at pages
650-72.
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in 1950, 1960, and 1970.' The broadest effort, by Professors Lawrence
Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, and Stanton Wheeler, looked
at citations in opinions from 16 state supreme courts over a period of 100
years.o A variety of other studies over many years have looked at citation
patterns in particular state supreme courts." Other efforts have included
examinations of citation patterns in federal appellate courts.' 2 These efforts
all aimed at understanding better how courts use, or at least cite, different
sources and identifying changes in those patterns over time.
A second, smaller, line of research has focused not on what authorities
courts use, but on what citations say about the strength of particular authori-
ties. Several studies have looked at the citation of law reviews by the courts
and legal periodicals. 3 These studies often looked at the influence of partic-
9. John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the
Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 381 (1977).
10. Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. Rv. 773 (1981); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., The Evolu-
tion of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978).
11. See Robert D. Archibald, Stare Decisis and the Ohio Supreme Court, 9 W. RES. L.
REV. 23 (1957); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate
Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J .129 (1994); Richard A. Mann, The North
Carolina Supreme Court 1977 A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 39, 43-45
(1979); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-
1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Peter McCormick, Investigation of Citation Practices,
22 MANSFIELD L.J. 286 (1993) (studying Canadian courts); William L. Reynolds, II, The
Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance (pt. 1), 38 MD. L. REv. 148
(1978); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 U. Mo.-K.C. L. REV. 228 (1964);
George R. Smith, The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas: A Study of
Craftsmanship, 1 ARK. L. REv. 89 (1947); Mary A. Bobinski, Comment, Citation Sources
and the New York Court of Appeals, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 965 (1985); William L. Turner,
Comment, Legal Periodicals: Their Use in Kansas, 7 KAN. L. REV. 490 (1959).
12. See Charles A. Johnson, Citations to Authority in Supreme Court Opinions, 7 LAw
& POL'Y 509 (1985); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial
Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 249, 255-57 (1976).
13. See Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in
United States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940 and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J.
1 (1983); Douglas B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to
the Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REv. 181 (1930); Richard A. Mann, The Use of
Legal Periodicals By Courts and Journals, 26 JuRIMERmcs J. 400 (1986); Olavi Maru,
Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 227, 233;
Louis Sirico & Jeffrey Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Em-
pin cal Study, 34 UCLAL. REv. 131 (1986); see also The Executive Board, Chicago-Kent Law
Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1989) (compiling list of most-
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ular journals, as measured by the rates at which they were cited. Other
authors have looked more narrowly at the most frequently cited opinions of
the United States Courts of Appeals" or the most frequently cited articles in
a particular law review."5
Ranking the productivity of law faculties has been a third major use of
quantitative analysis of legal writings. Professor Ira Ellman produced the
first such analysis, looking at the average number of pages published in the
"top 23" law reviews over a two and half year period by faculty members at
American law schools. 6 An unpublished, but widely discussed, study by
Professor Mayer Freed followed in the late 1980s, which examined the
publications of the faculties of the "top 20" law schools in the "top 25" legal
jouirnals. 7 The staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review decided to make this
task routine. In 1989, it published a comparative assessment of the scholarly
productivity of law school faculties, as measured by the average number of
pages published in the "top" law reviews. The 1989 version promised that
these studies would be produced every year. A second publication followed
in 1990, Is but the third was not published until late 1995. 1
These studies of faculty productivity have focused on the number of
pages published in particular legal periodicals; as far as I can determine, no
one has published a systematic survey of the frequency of citations to the
cited 50, 20, and 10 student-edited law reviews for use in survey of law faculty productivity).
14. See Robert Schriek, Most-Cited U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases from 1932 Until the
Late 1980s, 83 L. LiBR. J. 317 (1991). Schriek used the paper version of Shepard's Federal
Citations rather than electronic citation indices from either Westlaw or Lexis. Id. at 317,
320. The Westlaw system did not include citations from before 1956; Shriek found by test
that, at least at that time, the Lexis version of Shepards was less complete than the paper
version. Id. at 320-21.
15. See Shapiro I, supra note 4; Shapiro II, supra note 5 (for centenary volume of Yale
Law Journal). Both Shapiro articles contain interesting and useful discussions of the history
of "bibliometrics" - "studies which seek to quantify the processes of written communica-
tion," the definition given in Shapiro I, supra note 4, at 1541 n.8, which was taken from 12
ANN. REv. INFo. ScI. & TECH. 35 (1977).
16. Ira M. Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews,
33 J. LEGAL EDuC. 681 (1983).
17. Memorandum from Mayer Freed to Faculty and Deans of Northwestern University
School of Law (Feb. 1, 1989). Freed's work was discussed in the first Chicago-Kent survey,
The Executive Board, supra note 13, at 200-01, on whose discussion of the unpublished study
I have relied.
18. The Executive Board, Chicago-Kent Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 509 (1990).
19. Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Faculty Scholarship Sur-
vey, 70 ChI.-KENr L. REv. 1445 (1995).
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work of particular law professors or faculties.' There is some indication,
however, through a published objection to the practice, that citation counts
are being used to make decisions about hiring, tenuring, and paying law
professors.2'
Although use of these kinds of quantitative analysis seems to be growing
more common, no one seems to have made rigorous use of this kind of anal-
ysis to look at an individual judge until 1990, when Judge Richard Posner
published a monograph on the reputation of Judge and Justice Benjamin
Cardozo.2' Posner devoted the fifth chapter of his monograph to a quantita-
tive analysis of citations to Cardozo's work.
Posner first examined the number of law review articles that mentioned
various prominent judges and academics to see how often Cardozo was
mentioned compared to others. He then shifted to comparing the number of
citations in subsequent judicial opinions to majority opinions written by Car-
dozo, first on the New York Court of Appeals and then on the U.S. Supreme
Court, and to a sample of majority opinions written during the same time by
his colleagues on those courts. Finally, he examined the use of opinions by
Cardozo in selected legal casebooks. Throughout this part of his analysis,
Posner focused on citations as a measure of Cardozo's reputation relative to
other judges.
Later in the book, Posner made some other quantitative comparisons of
Cardozo's opinions with those of his colleagues on the New York Court of
Appeals. Posner compared 60 Cardozo opinions with 60 other New York
Court of Appeals opinions with respect to several aspects of how they were
written: length of sentences, length of opinion, number of cases cited, and
number of scholarly citations. Posner ended by, among other things, sug-
gesting fuller use of computerized data bases in studying both Cardozo' and
other judges. 4
20. In addition to these page tallies, Professor Richard Delgado has made a different and
fascinating use of this kind of data. He has focused on citations to particular authors' law
review articles. He examined the citations in law review articles on civil rights and concluded
that they showed "white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars
from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to acknowledge
only each other's work." Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 566 (1984). But see Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 1770-78 (1989) (criticizing
Delgado's argument).
21. See Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judgments on Promotion,
Tenure, and Status, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 829 (1993).
22. POSNER, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 144.
24. Id. at 149 (item 6), 150 (item 9).
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Posner's book on Cardozo's reputation was widely reviewed; a number
of the reviews focused critically on his use of citation analysis.' One re-
viewer dismissed Posner's effort "to measure Justice Cardozo's reputation
by ... the number of times that Cardozo's opinions have been cited in the
legal literature over time as revealed by a search through Mead Data Cen-
tral's Lexis computer data base" as "simply bizarre. "I Another disparaged
the work as Cardozo's "baseball card."' Several reviewers went so far as
to note that measuring judicial stature by citations would bolster the standing
of Judge Posner himself, a prolific, controversial, and often-cited scholar-
judge.'
Posner has returned to judicial citation analysis at least once in print. In
an appendix to his book review of Professor Gerald Gunther's biography of
Learned Hand, Posner explored empirically the question he felt Gunther had
slighted: "Was Hand really a great judge?"'29 He compared, in a series of
seven five- or six-year time periods, the number of citations in the federal
courts of appeals to Hand's published opinions with those to such opinions
by his colleagues on the Second Circuit.'0 He looked both at total citations
and citations from 1988 to 1992, long after Hand's last opinion was pub-
lished in 1961.3 He also corrected for "self-citations" and looked at cita-
25. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, Judging by Reputation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 739 (1992)
(book review); Virgil L.P. Blake, Citation Studies-The Missing Background, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961 (1991) (book review); Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Reputation Evaluated: The
Cardozo Instance, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1915 (1991) (book review); Richard D. Friedman, On
Cardozo and Reputation: Legendary Judge, Underrated Justice?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923
(1991) (book review); James D. Gordon m, Cardozo's Baseball Card, 44 STAN. L. REv. 899,
900-02, 908 (1992) (book review); John W. Johnson, Book Review, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
323, 324 (1991); David A. Logan, The Man in the Mirror, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1739, 1752-53
(1992) (book review); William Powers, Jr:, Reputology, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1941 (1991)
(book review); David A.J. Richards, Cardozo, the Idea of the Great Judge, and the Theory of
Adjudication, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955 (1991) (book review); Keith A. Stiverson & Lynn
Wishart, Citation Studies-Measuring Rods of Judicial Reputation?, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1969
(1991) (book review); Note, The Judge's Path to Greatness, 104 HARV. L. REv. 788, 792-93
(1991) (reviewing book); Paul A. Freund, Reputation by Citation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990,
§ 7, at 31 (same); Sheldon M. Novick, Book Review, A Study in Reputation, TRIAL, Mar. 1991,
at 84, 87 (same).
26. Arkin, supra note 25, at 744.
27. Gordon, supra note 25, at 900.
28. Note, supra note 25, at 793; Logan, supra note 25, at 1752-53.
29. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534 (1994) (reviewing GERARD GUNTHHER, LEARNED HAND:
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)).
30. Id. at 535-39.
31. Id.
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tions outside the Second Circuit.' Posner concluded that "[t]he analysis in
this Appendix furnishes some confirmation - bearing in mind the high
quality of the Second Circuit during Hand's tenure - that Learned Hand was
indeed a great judge."33
In his study of Cardozo, Posner expressed the hope that his quantitative
analysis of citations to judicial opinions would be followed widely. It seems
instead to have been criticized and then largely ignored. The only published
exception is some preliminary work by Professor Lawrence Lessig, set out
as an appendix to a fascinating evaluation by the Chicago Council of Law-
yers of the then-sitting members of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.'
Lessig described his work as "the preliminary results of a more extensive
research project that Professor William Landes and I are conducting, de-
signed to gauge the productivity of federal judges. "" In this publication, at
least, the data were presented without substantial interpretation, as forty
tables or graphs with only explanations of the derivations of the data.3
For each judge on the Seventh Circuit, Lessig presented information
about citations to the judge's opinions and the effects the judge had on the
speed with which opinions were released.3' His citation analysis looked at
the number of citations to the judge's opinions in light of both the total
number of the judge's opinions and the number of years the judge had served
on the court.38 He broke these citations down into district court and circuit
court citations, both within and outside the Seventh Circuit, and looked at
the percentage of self-citations. 39 Lessig also presented information on the
treatment recorded by Shepards for the citations - criticized, distinguished,
32. Id. at 539-40.
33. Id. at 540.
34. The Council released its evaluation in February 1994. The evaluation, with the
Lessig appendix, was published later in 1994 as Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 673 (1994).
35. Id. at 825. The work referred to, Landes et al., supra note 3, is a comprehensive
effort to measure the reputation of individual judges by the number of times their opinions
are cited. Landes, Lessig, and Solimine apply regression analysis to assess judicial "produc-
tivity" in terms of citations per opinion, after adjusting for length of tenure and other factors.
Id. They then examine the productivity, so defined, of over 170 circuit judges sitting in
1992. Id. Their focus is on comparisons of this productivity across judges, not across time.
Id. Their findings are most relevant to Section III of this article and will be discussed in that
context.
36. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 34, at 831-57.
37. See id. at 825 (stating that data contain studies of citations and of efficiency).
38. See id. at 826-28 (explaining Lessig's citation analysis).
39. See id.
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explained, and so on.4 He then provided citations to the ten most-cited
opinions of each judge.4 Lessig also provided information on the extent to
which judges wrote separate concurrences and dissents, as well as informa-
tion on how often they agreed or disagreed with specific colleagues.4' Les-
sig's published preliminary analysis contained useful data about the Seventh
Circuit, but did not put that data to work in discussing the judges' careers,
either separately or relative to each other.
There are good reasons, many of them noted by Judge Posner himself,
to be skeptical about ranking judicial reputations, let alone judges them-
selves, on the basis of citation counts. Yet, as Sections II and H1 below seek
to demonstrate, a quantitative analysis of judicial opinions and citations to
them can provide some useful insights.
II. Judge Wisdom's Opinions
This Section provides some overall data about Judge Wisdom's pub-
lished judicial opinions. My analysis is based on downloaded versions of
every opinion reported in the Lexis database that shows Judge Wisdom as
the author, including dissenting and concurring opinions. The opinions I
analyze include those that he has written as a member of three-judge district
courts, of the Multidistrict Panel on Complex Litigation, and of the Special
Court for the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973 ("the Railroad
Court"). I did not include any per curiam opinions he has written, any short
orders, or any unpublished opinions, whether or not present in the Lexis
database.43 For purposes of comparison, I determined the numbers of major-
ity, concurring, dissenting, and concurring and dissenting opinions for
nearly sixty other judges. My research assistant looked at the percentages
of majority and separate opinions in sets of cases arbitrarily chosen from
both the Fifth Circuit and from all circuits for eight sample years: 1960,
1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. To provide comparisons
for the counts of words and footnotes, I downloaded from Lexis some thirty
to fifty arbitrarily selected majority opinions from the Fifth Circuit and from
the Courts of Appeals as a whole for the same eight sample years.
40. See id. at 827.
41. See id. at 828.
42. See id. at 829-30.
43. The Lexis database includes opinions that the courts involved did not expect to have
published and whose validity as precedent may be limited by circuit rules. Lexis "publica-
tion" of such "unpublished" opinions appears to have become common in the 1980s, starting
with Sixth Circuit opinions in 1982. I did, however, find two much earlier unpublished
Wisdom opinions in Lexis, one from 1971 and one from 1973. I excluded both.
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Judge Wisdom's first opinion, Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295
(5th Cir. 1957), was issued on November 13, 1957. In the thirty-eight years
following, through December 31, 1995, he has written 1,393 signed, pub-
lished opinions. Of these opinions, 1,227 were for the Fifth Circuit, 117 for
other circuits, 28 for district courts, 9 for the Multidistrict Panel on Complex
Litigation, and 12 for the Railroad Court.' Overwhelmingly, he has written
majority opinions. His published opinions include only 25 concurring opin-
ions, 99 dissenting opinions, and 6 opinions concurring and dissenting with
a majority opinion.45 His opinions are shown in Table 1, below.
Table 1. Total Judge Wisdom Opinions
Concur. &
Opinions Total Majority Concurring Dissenting Dissent.
Fifth Circuit 1,227 1,113 19 90 5
Other Circuit 117 110 3 3 1
District Court 28 20 3 5 0
Multidistrict Litigation 9 8 0 1 0
Railroad Court 12 12 0 0 0
A. The Fifth Circuit Opinions
The Fifth Circuit has, not surprisingly, accounted for most of Judge
Wisdom's opinions, 1,227 out of 1,393. The number of his Fifth Circuit
majority opinions per year, however, has varied substantially, from 54 in
1961 to only 10 in 1989. 46 The average number of his Fifth Circuit majority
opinions per full year by decade was 36.1 in the 1960s, 39.0 in the 1970s,
16.2 in the 1980s, and, thus far, 20.7 in the 1990s. A more complete distri-
bution of his Fifth Circuit opinions - majority, concurring, dissenting, and
concurring and dissenting - over the past thirty-eight years is shown in
Table 2, below.
44. Congress established the Special Court for the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act
of 1973 to handle a variety of legal issues arising out of the statue that, among other things,
created Conrail. Twenty-three years later, the court remains active.
45. Defining an opinion as "concurring and dissenting" can be difficult because many
dissents could be characterized as "partially concurring." For this paper, I used the categoriza-
tion used by Lexis; if it showed a case where Judge Wisdom had written both a concurrence and
a dissent, I counted the opinion as concurring and dissenting.
46. This range excludes Judge Wisdom's first year on the bench, when his first opinion
was released in mid-November.
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Table 2. Judge Wisdom's Fifth Circuit Opinions
Majority Concurring Dissenting Con. & Dis. Total
1957 3 0 0 0 3
1958 42 0 2 0 44
1959 50 0 5 0 55
1960 37 0 2 0 39
1961 54 1 4 0 59
1962 47 0 6 0 53
1963 39 0 2 0 41
1964 26 1 1 0 28
1965 33 0 1 0 34
1966 36 1 1 0 38
1967 26 2 4 0 32
1968 29 0 2 0 31
1969 34 0 2 0 36
1970 44 0 7 1 52
1971 47 1 3 0 51
1972 45 3 11 0 59
1973 37 0 5 0 42
1974 48 0 1 0 49
1975 35 0 4 0 39
1976 21 1 1 1 24
1977 36 1 4 0 41
1978 26 4 5 0 35
1979 31 0 2 0 33
1980 17 0 0 0 17
1981 20 0 1 0 21
1982 17 0 0 0 17
1983 19 0 2 0 21
1984 12 3 1 1 17
1985 19 0 1 0 20
1986 15 0 2 1 18
1987 18 1 2 0 21
1988 15 0 1 0 16
1989 10 0 0 1 11
1990 26 0 0 0 26
1991 18 0 1 0 19
1992 15 0 2 0 17
1993 15 0 0 0 15
1994 28 0 2 0 30
1995 23 0 0 0 23
Total 1113 19 90 5 1227
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 99 (1996)
Excluding the three opinions of his first year, Judge Wisdom has aver-
aged 29.2 Fifth Circuit majority opinions and 32.2 total Fifth Circuit opin-
ions per year. Both the majority and total opinions per' year show two
peaks, one in the early 1960s and another in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Judge Wisdom had major heart surgery in 1976, leading to the drop in cases
for that year. He took senior status on January 15, 1977 and his Fifth
Circuit majority opinions fell to a lower level of between 36 and 10 per year.
Overall, he averaged 36.6 Fifth Circuit majority opinions per year from
1958 through 1977 and 19 from 1978 through 1995. 4'
B. The Other Circuit Opinions
Judge Wisdom has written 110 published majority opinions while sitting
by designation on other Courts of Appeals - the equivalent of more than
three full years of service on such courts. He has written opinions for every
federal court of appeals except the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Table
3 shows the number of opinions he has written while sitting by designation
on other circuits.
Table 3. Judge Wisdom's Opinions for Other Circuits -
Listed by Circuit
Circuit Majority Concurring Dissenting Con. & Dis.
First 38 1 0 0
Second 2 0 0 0
Third 3 0 0 0
Fourth 6 0 0 0
Sixth 0 0 0 0
Seventh 18 0 1 0
Eighth 0 0 0 0
Ninth 12 0 1 1
Tenth 0 0 0 0
Eleventh 27 2 1 0
D.C. 2 0 0 0
Federal 2 0 0 0
Totals 110 3 3 1
47. The Landes, Lessig, and Solimine data indicate that, of their sample of 18 Fifth
Circuit judges sitting in 1992 (which excluded those judges named most recently to the court),
the judges had averaged about 34.5 signed majority opinions per year over their careers.
Landes et al., supra note 3, at tbl. 1.
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Table 4. Judge Wisdom's Opinions for Other Circuits -
Listed by Year and Total Majority Opinions
Majority Concurring Dissenting Con. & Dis. Totals
1973 2 0 0 0 37
1974 0 0 0 0 48
1975 0 0 0 0 35
1976 0 0 0 0 21
1977 0 0 0 0 36
1978 249 0 0 0 28
1979 210 0 0 0 33
1980 651 0 0 0 23
1981 5s5 0 0 0 25
1982 8 1 0 0 25
1983 454 0 1 0 24
1984 20ss  1 0 0 32
1985 15m 0 1 0 34
1986 8s  0 0 0 23
1987 1258 1 1 0 30
1988 759 0 0 0 22
1989 7 0 0 0 17
1990 0 0 0 0 26
1991 400 0 0 0 22
1992 761 0 0 1 22
1993 0 0 0 0 15
1994 0 0 0 0 28




51. First Circuit, 5 cases; Seventh Circuit, 2 cases.
52. Seventh Circuit.
53. Seventh Circuit, 2 cases; Ninth Circuit, 3 cases; Eleventh Circuit, 4 cases, includ-
ing the concurrence.
54. Second Circuit, 1 case; Seventh Circuit, 1 case; Eleventh Circuit, 2 cases, including
the dissent.
55. First Circuit, 5 cases; Ninth Circuit, 3 cases; Eleventh Circuit, 11 cases, including
a dissent; and Federal Circuit, 2 cases.
56. First Circuit, 8 cases; Third Circuit, 3 cases; Seventh Circuit, 4 cases; Ninth
Circuit, 1 case, a dissent; and Eleventh Circuit, 1 case.
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Almost all of this activity on other circuits came after Judge Wisdom
had taken senior status. Of his 117 opinions for other circuits, all but two
came after 1977. The distribution of these opinions over time is shown in
Table 4, above. Footnotes identify the particular circuit or circuits for
which Judge Wisdom wrote in a given year.
Table 4 provides a more accurate assessment of Judge Wisdom's work-
load since taking senior status in January 1977. When Fifth Circuit majority
opinions are combined with majority opinions for other circuits, his average
number of majority opinions per year and before and after senior status
changes as shown in Table 5, below.
Table 5. Judge Wisdom's Average Majority Opinions Per Stated Period
Fifth Circuit Other Circuits Total
1960s 36.1 0.0 36.1
1970s 39.0 0.6 39.6
1980s 16.2 9.3 25.5
1990s 20.8 1.8 22.7
Before 1977 38.4 0.1 38.5
1977 and After 20.0 5.7 25.7
C. The Non-Appellate Opinions
In addition to his appellate work, Judge Wisdom has served as a federal
judge in three other contexts. First, like other circuit judges of his era, he
served on the three-judge district courts required for many years to hear
federal constitutional challenges to state statutes.6' Second, Judge Wisdom
57. First Circuit, 4 cases; Eleventh Circuit, 4 cases.
58. First Circuit, 9 cases, including one concurrence; Fourth Circuit, 2 cases; Seventh
Circuit, 1 case; Eleventh Circuit, 2 cases.
59. First Circuit, 4 cases; Ninth Circuit, 1 case; Eleventh Circuit, 2 cases.
60. Eleventh Circuit.
61. Third Circuit, 1 case; Seventh Circuit, 5 cases; Ninth Circuit, 3 cases.
62. The three-judge district court arose as a congressional response to fears of expand-
ing federal jurisdiction following the Supreme Court's holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). As originally enacted, the law required that suits for certain preliminary injunc-
tions against state officials be heard by three-judge district courts. In 1925, Congress
extended the requirement to suits seeking final injunctions against unconstitutional state laws,
and in 1937, during the controversy over the constitutionality of New Deal statutes, Congress
adopted a similar requirement for constitutional challenges to federal laws. See 28 U.S.C.
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served on the Multidistrict Litigation Panel from 1968 to 1978 and was its
chair from 1975 to 1978. The Panel coordinates the federal judicial re-
sponse to situations where plaintiffs have filed a large number of related civil
cases in different districts. Third, Judge Wisdom sits on the Railroad Court.
Congress established this court to resolve legal issues arising largely from
the federal acquisition of the properties of bankrupt railroads and their con-
solidation into Conrail. Judge Wisdom has been on this court since its
inception and has been presiding judge since 1986.63 Judge Wisdom's opin-
ions in these three non-appellate contexts are shown in Table 6, next page.
The entirety of Judge Wisdom's signed and published judicial output in
all courts - what might be called Judge Wisdom's baseball card' - is
summarized in Table 7, page 117.
Ill. Analyzing the Opinions
The digital texts of Judge Wisdom's nearly 1400 opinions could be
used to explore many issues.65 I use them in this article to compare certain
aspects of Judge Wisdom's published opinions both to each other, over time,
and to the published opinions of other judges on the Fifth and other circuits.
This Section will look at his separate opinions, the length of his majority
opinions, and the number of footnotes in his majority opinions.
§§ 2281, 2282 (repealed 1976). Perhaps because of the complexity of the law to which these
provisions gave rise and the burden on the lower courts, Congress repealed the general three-
judge court provisions in 1976. Today, three-judge district courts are required only for some
limited statutory cases or "when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the
apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative
body." 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1988); see generally PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 893 (3d ed. 1994); David
P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
1 (1964).
63. The Railroad Court's first members, appointed in 1975, were Judge Henry Friendly
of the Second Circuit, Judge Rozel C. Thomson of the District of Maryland, and Judge
Wisdom. All three men were about 70 years old when appointed to the Railroad Court. Both
Judges Friendly and Thomson have died and been replaced, but the work of the Railroad
Court, based on the now-23 year old acquisition, continues.
64. The phrase is from James D. Gordon III in his review of Posner's work on
Cardozo, supra note 25, but without intending to include the pejorative connotation that
Gordon gives it. Baseball cards are not broad or incisive analyses of important matters, but
they do have their uses.
65. To give one very parochial example, generations of Judge Wisdom's law clerks
have been told never to begin a sentence with "however" unless using it in the sense of "in
whatever manner." At least that audience would be interested in seeing how consistently the
Judge has followed his own rule.
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,Table 6. Judge Wisdom's Non-Circuit Opinions
District Court Railroad Court Multidistrict Litig.
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Table 7. Judge Wisdom's Opinions by Year of Publication
Other CA Dist. Ct. I MDL Panel I R.R. Ct.















































































































































































Ma i  1113 110 20 8 12 1263
Total 1227 117 28 9 12 1393
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A. Separate Opinions
Judge Wisdom has written 1,393 published opinions. Of those, 1,263
were majorities, 25 were concurrences, 99 were dissents, and 6 were opinions
both concurring and dissenting. Thus, the overwhelming majority of his
opinions (90.7%) were majorities, with only rare concurrences and dissents.
These numbers, by themselves, tell us little. We can use them to look at two
questions: How has Judge Wisdom's pattern of separate opinions varied at
different times and in different settings, and how does his pattern compare
with those of other judges?
Judge Wisdom often has written separately in the context of three-judge
district courts and in Fifth Circuit en bane decisions and much less often in
non-en bane Fifth Circuit cases and in decisions for other circuits. As shown
in Table 2, Judge Wisdom's separate opinions in the Fifth Circuit have not
been frequent: about 0.5 concurrences, 2.5 dissents, and 0.12 concurring and
dissenting opinions per year on average. He was, however, much more
willing to write separately when the decision was made by the court en bane.
Five of his 19 concurrences, 19 of his 90 dissents, and 2 of his 5 opinions
concurring and dissenting were written in response to en bane decisions of the
court. Over the years, Judge Wisdom wrote only 6 majority opinions for the
en bane Fifth Circuit; concurring opinions are 16% of his total en bane opin-
ions, dissents are 59%, and concurring and dissenting opinions are 6%.
When en bane decisions are subtracted from his Fifth Circuit separate opin-
ions, his separate opinions as a percentage of his total opinions fall to 7.3%.
The increasing willingness to write separately in en bane decisions has
at least two plausible explanations. First, the process of selecting en bane
decisions guarantees that any case so heard is a contentious one. A case is set
for rehearing en bane only if a majority of the active members of the Fifth
Circuit believe that the case justifies such treatment, presumably because those
judges believe the issue is important and are uncertain about the way the panel
resolved it.67 Second, en bane decisions are more important to the law of the
circuit than panel decisions.
When writing for other circuits, only 7 of Judge Wisdom's 117 opinions
were separate, or 6%, compared with 9.3 % of his total Fifth Circuit opinions.
Notably, however, Judge Wisdom sat on no en bane cases in other circuits.
When compared with his non-en bane separate opinions for the Fifth Circuit,
the difference is smaller; Judge Wisdom has written separately in only 7.3%
of the non-en bane Fifth Circuit opinions.
Judge Wisdom wrote separately often when sitting in three-judge district
courts. He has written 28 opinions for such courts, all but two before the
66. See infra part II.A.
67. 5TH CIR. R. 35.6.
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jurisdiction of three-judge district courts was reduced greatly in 1976. Eight
of those opinions were separate. All 8 of his separate opinions appeared
between 1959 and 1972; 4 involved questions of racial discrimination and 3
others involved nonracial voting rights issues. The statistics for separate
opinions in these settings are set forth in Table 8, below.6"
Table 8. Separate Opinions as Percentage of Total Opinions:
Fifth Circuit, Fifth Circuit Non-En Banc, Other Circuit,
Three-Judge District Courts
Concurring Dissenting Con. and Dis.
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
All Fifth Cir. Opinions 19 1.5% 90 7.3% 5 0.4%
En Banc Fifth Cir. 5 16% 19 59% 2 0.6%
Non-En Banc Fifth Cir. 14 1.2% 71 5.9% 3 0.3%
Other Circuit Opinions 3 2.6% 3 2.6% 1 0.9%
3-Judge District Courts 5 17.9% 3 10.7% 0 0.0%
A second question is whether Judge Wisdom's likeliness to write sepa-
rately has changed over time. Table 9, below, shows the distribution of Judge
Wisdom's separate appellate opinions over time calculated in roughly five-
year increments, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of his total opin-
ions.
Table 9. Number of Separate Appellate Opinions by Judge Wisdom
Over Time and as Percentage of Total Opinions
Concurring Dissenting Con. & Dis. Total Sep.
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
1957-1960 0 0.0% 9 6.4% 0 0.0% 9 6.4%
1961-1965 2 0.9% 14 6.5% 0 0.0% 16 7.4%
1966-1970 3 1.6% 16 8.5% 1 0.5% 20 10.6%
1971-1975 4 1.7% 24 9.9% 0 0.0% 28 11.6%
1976-1980 6 3.8% 12 7.5% 1 0.6% 19 11.9%
1981-1985 5 3.3% 7 4.6% 1 0.7% 13 8.6%
1986-1990 2 1.6% 6 3.9% 2 1.6% 10 7.1%
1991-1995 0 0.0% 5 4.3% 1 0.9% 6 5.2%
68. I have not included the Multidistrict Litigation Panel or the Railroad Court in this
analysis because Judge Wisdom wrote so few opinions for either (9 and 12 respectively) and
only one separate opinion, a dissent from a Multidistrict Litigation Panel decision.
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 99 (1996)
This table reveals that Judge Wisdom was most likely to write sepa-
rately in the middle part of his career, from 1966 through 1980. One partial
explanation may be that, as noted above, he wrote separately more readily
in response to en bane decisions. Once he took senior status in 1977, his
participation in en bane decisions was limited greatly. This distinction,
however, does not explain the lower rate of separate opinions before 1966.
One possible explanation is the combination of the political make-up of
the Fifth Circuit's judges and the kinds of issues presented. In 1957, when
Judge Wisdom joined the court, it had 7 members, including four other
Eisenhower appointees and one Hoover appointee, Chief Judge Hutcheson.
In an ironic counterpoint to today's politics, the Eisenhower appointees were
much more likely to be "liberal" in their decisions, particularly about civil
rights, than later Democratic appointees, even those appointed by Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson. 9 The burst of dissents in the second half of the
1960s may reflect both the addition of these judges and the litigation that
followed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. The judges to whose Fifth Circuit opinions Judge Wisdom
wrote separately are shown in Table 10, next page.
Many of these judges clearly were viewed as politically opposite to
Judge Wisdom. Among such judges one might group Judges Bell, Cameron,
Coleman, and Gewin. These four judges, collectively, account for 29 of the
Fifth Circuit opinions, over 30%, to which Judge Wisdom wrote sep-
arately.70 On the other hand, no similar burst of Wisdom separate opinions
heralded the arrival of the more conservative judges appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush.
Looking at majority opinions written by Judge Wisdom to which his
Fifth Circuit colleagues have written separately may provide another per-
spective. His colleagues on the Fifth Circuit have written 90 separate opin-
ions to Wisdom majority opinions. The distribution of such opinions over
time is shown in Table 11, next page.
69. Judge Harold Cox of the District of Mississippi, for example, was the first district
judge appointed by President Kennedy, and, during his tenure, perhaps the most openly racist
and obstructionist member of the federal judiciary. See JACK BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 164-
68 (1981). Cox, of course, was "nominated" by the President, but effectively selected by the
Democratic senators from his state, then Senators Eastland and Stennis, whose views on civil
rights were clearly different from President Kennedy's.
70. Cameron is particularly interesting. He dissented from Wisdom opinions 10 times,
while writing majorities to which Wisdom dissented only 2.5 times.
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Table 10. Authors of Fifth Circuit Majority Opinions to
Which Judge Wisdom Wrote Separately 7
Author No. Author No.
Ainsworth 2 Hutcheson 3
Barksdale 3 Ingraham 1
Bell 7 Warren Jones 3
Brown 3.5 Edith Jones 2
Cameron 2.5 Morgan 2
Clark 2 Roney 2
Coleman 12.5 En bane per curiam op. 3
Connally (Dist. Judge) 3 Reavley 1
Davis 1 Rives 7.5
Dyer 1 Simpson 2.5
Fay 1 Smith (Dist. Judge) 0.5
R. Garza 1 Thornberry 1.5
Gee 4 Tjoflat 1.5
Gewin 7 Tuttle 2
Godbold 4 Williams 1
Higginbotham 2
Table 11. Fifth Circuit Separate Opinions to Wisdom Majorities
No. of Separate Opinions to As Percentage of Wisdom









71. Many of these dissents were written to per curiam opinions. When the per curiam
opinion was written by the en bane court, I have put it into its own category. A surprising
number of the dissents, however, were written to per curiam opinions joined by only two
judges on the panel. In such cases, I have counted the majority opinion as one-half written
by each of the judges who joined it. And one of the dissents, in Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 265 F.2d 547, vacated, 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959), was to a majority opinion written
by Judge Wisdom himself - which Judges Hutcheson and Cameron joined but to which its
author wrote a dissent. This style of opinion assignment has gone out of fashion.
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Like Judge Wisdom's separate opinions, Fifth Circuit separate opinions
to his majority opinions are concentrated in the first half of his career. Inter-
estingly, though, these opinions peaked in the first part of his career, before
1971. In fact, the two highest time periods were the first two periods that he
was on the court - 1957-1960 and 1961-1965.
Table 12, below, shows the judges sitting on the Fifth Circuit who wrote
separately to Wisdom majorities. A large percentage of the separate opinions
to Wisdom majorities were written by judges often viewed as politically on the
opposite side from him. Such judges clearly would include Bell, Cameron,
Clark, Coleman, Cox, Gee, and Warren Jones. Those 7 out of 28 judges
account for 41, or 45 %, of the separate opinions.
Table 12. Fifth Circuit Separate Opinions to
Wisdom Majorities, By Judge
Author No. Author No.
Ainsworth I Godbold 4
Bell 2 Henderson 1
Brown 6 Higginbotham 1
Cameron 10 Hutcheson 5
Clark 3 Jolly 1
Coleman 11 Jones (Warren) 8
Cox (Dist. Judge) 3 Jones (Edith) 1
DeVane (Dist. Judge) 1 Randall (King) 1
Estes (Dist. Judge) 1 Rives 8
Fay 1 Roney 1
Fitzwater (Dist. Judge) 1 Rubin 2
Garza 2 Simpson 5
Gee 4 Tate 3
Gewin 3 Tuttle 2
On the other hand, in Judge Wisdom's first few years on the Fifth Circuit,
even those who were often viewed as his allies dissented from him occasion-
ally. His first nine years on the bench, through 1963, accounted for 36 of the
90 dissenting opinions. During that period, Judge Brown wrote 5 dissents
from Wisdom's opinions, Judge Tuttle wrote 2, and Judge Rives wrote 4.
The curve of separate opinions to Wisdom opinions trends downward,
almost from the beginning. This may indicate that, in his early years, Judge
Wisdom was more likely to write opinions that his colleagues would find
objectionable, perhaps because he had not yet mastered either the craft of
writing majority opinions that would be persuasive to his colleagues or the art
of modifying draft majority opinions to avoid separate opinions. It might also
be, of course, that Judge Wisdom's reputation with his colleagues grew over
the years in a way that would make them less likely to write separately. By
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contrast, the curve of his separate opinions climbs after several years. Per-
haps only after several years was he confident enough of his positions to write
separately regularly. This is not to ignore the political issues but to suggest
that an internal factor - the state of Judge Wisdom's career - may also have
influenced this pattern. Whether separate opinions by, and to, other circuit
judges show the same pattern is an interesting question that could be tested.
My first reaction to seeing how rarely Judge Wisdom had written separ-
ately was that my data must be wrong. Then I realized that I was probably,
subconsciously, comparing his rate of separate opinions to that of United
States Supreme Court justices. Their patterns of writing separately may be
very different from those of circuit judges. And different circuits, or different
periods of time, may have different patterns of separate opinions. I examined,
therefore, the percentage of separate opinions for 16 of the Supreme Court
justices who sat during Judge Wisdom's tenure on the Fifth Circuit, for 13
Fifth Circuit judges, and for thirty-three judges from other courts of appeals. 2
The results are shown in Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. Each table shows,
for each of the judges listed, the total number of published, signed opinions
that the judge has written in cases on his or her own court and the percentage
of those opinions that were majorities, concurrences, dissents, or opinions
both concurring and dissenting.73 (Opinions concurring and dissenting are not
counted as either the concurrences or the dissents in order to avoid double-
counting.) Each table ends with the averages of the percentages of each kind
of opinion for all the judges listed.74
72. I chose judges who had substantial service and who seemed to me prominent. I did
not make a methodical search and have left off some undoubtedly distinguished prominent
judges, both for reasons of space and from oversights. Two other caveats are important. First,
I avoided judges who shared a last name with judges on the same court during the same period.
Thus, the Judges Nelson of the Ninth Circuit, Ginsburg (one current, one former) of the District
of Columbia Circuit, and Arnold of the Eighth Circuit, among others, are not included. Second,
I did not look for opinions by judges sitting outside their own court of appeals. I was concerned
that I would get additional name conflicts if I did not limit the search to a particular court of
appeals file (the Judges Higginbotham of the Third and Fifth Circuits, for example). I also
feared that judges might have a different pattern of writing separate opinions when they were
sitting by designation in other circuits, either out of deference to their hosts or for lack of
established, long-term relationships with the other judges.
73. These tables looked only at opinions the circuit judges wrote for their own circuits;
thus, the totals for Judge Wisdom are slightly different from those given above.
74. Note that this is different from the overall percentage of any type of opinion among
those listed. If the table had two judges, one of whom had written 500 majority opinions out
of 1,000 total opinions and the other had written 400 majority opinions out of 500 total, the
average shown would be (50% + 80%)/2 = 65%, while the overall percentage would be 500
+ 400 / 1500 = 60%. In these tables, I am interested in the average of the percentages of each
judge, rather than the overall percentage from among all the opinions of the selected judges.
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Average 43.9 21.5 30.0 4.2
Table 14. Opinions by Type: Selected Fifth Circuit Judges
76
Total Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
No. Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
Brown 1758 81.2 7.4 10.0 1.6
Cameron 425 66.1 9.2 26.1 0.0
Clark 1077 82.5 5.5 10.3 1.7
Coleman 649 80.9 5.5 11.1 2.6
Gee 963 84.6 5.7 8.4 1.5
Higginbotham 620 88.2 6.5 3.7 1.9
E. Jones 494 87.2 5.5 6.3 1.2
King' 657 91.5 3.7 5.8 0.5
Politz 907 95.1 1.1 3.5 0.2
Rives 1227 79.5 5.5 15.0 0.5
Roney 1466 85.5 5.5 7.8 1.1
Rubin 910 84.6 5.4 9.2 1.0
Tuttle 1174 89.7 2.0 7.2 1.3
Wisdom 1224 90.9 1.7 7.2 0.5
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Table 15. Opinions by Type: Selected D.C. Circuit Judges
Total Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
No. Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
Bazelon 1034 58.0 15.2 24.1 3.3
Buckley 248 85.1 7.2 4.0 4.0
Burger 415 67.2 13.7 16.6 2.4
Leventhal 504 80.0 12.7 6.7 1.4
McGowan 454 86.1 8.8 4.2 0.9
MacKinnon 591 56.0 16.1 19.3 9.0
Robinson 435 81.1 9.7 8.3 1.1
Silberman 311 69.1 17.7 10.3 2.9
Tamm 525 76.8 8.2 -13.3 1.9
Wald 576 70.8 6.8 20.3 2.8
Wright 624 64.7 13.1 19.1 3.0
Average 72.3 11.7 13.3 3.0
75. I conducted these searches in August and September 1995. I intended to include
only opinions in argued cases. For each justice, I searched the U.S. file in the "Genfed"
library in Lexis in the following pattern: "writtenby (X) and argued", "opinionby MA and
argued", "concurby (X) and argued", "dissentby (X) and argued", and "concurby and
dissentby (X) and argued". As the search for "argued" would pick up any use of the word
"argued," and not just its use in caption where the date of argument is given, it is possible
that a dissent from denial of certiorari or other memorandum order that contained the word
"argued" was included in the count. A brief look at some of the citations disclosed no such
orders; I believe that any such instances are too few to affect the results significantly. For
Justices Harlan, Marshall, and White, who shared their last names with earlier Supreme
Court justices, I also imposed a date limitation, such as, for example, "date aft 1950".
76. Almost all of these searches were conducted in September 1995; a few were
conducted in October 1995. For these searches, and those in other circuits, I used the
circuit-specific file of the Lexis "Genfed" library. I sought only full, published opinions
by searches in the format "writtenby (x) and not (per curiam or unpublished opinion or
unpublished order)". This would have excluded opinions that concurred with or dissented
from per curiam opinions, as well as full opinions in which the excluded words appeared.
This might or might not be a trivial number. This search, for example, found 1224 pub-
lished Fifth Circuit opinions written by Judge Wisdom. The complete count from down-
loading his opinions for the relevant period revealed 1226. These exclusions seem unlikely
to differ from judge to judge or to substantially affect the results.
77. Judge King was known as Judge Randall until 1988. This count includes her
opinions under both last names and excludes a Judge King who served on the Fifth Circuit
in the early part of this century.
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Table 16. Opinions by Type: Selected Ninth Circuit Judges
Total Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
No. Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
Browning 394 84.0 5.1 9.6 2.0
Duniway 780 90.5 6.0 5.3 1.8
Fletcher 595 83.5 5.0 10.4 1.2
Goodwin 707 90.4 3.0 5.7 1.0
Kozinski 297 64.0 10.8 27.3 0.7
Norris 395 67.3 9.9 20.0 3.5
Pregerson 543 74.0 4.6 19.5 1.8
Rymer 194 62.9 12.9 19.6 5.7
Sneed 756 81.6 9.4 8.2 1.1
Wallace 888 78.3 8.9 9.5 4.7
Wright 829 90.0 4.3 6.8 1.0
Average 78.8 7.3 12.9 2.2
Table 17. Opinions by Type: Selected Other Circuit Judges
Total Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
No. Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
Adams 657 67.3 16.3 14.3 2.3
Bright 1046 77.8 7.4 12.5 2.5
Becker 569 77.9 8.3 9.5 4.6
Coffin 1191 95.0 1.8 3.2 0.2
Cummings 1132 92.1 1.9 5.1 0.6
Easterbrook 799 86.2 7.6 5.4 0.6
Flaum 837 88.4 6.1 3.9 1.6
Friendly 997 81.5 8.4 8.5 1.5
Murrah 858 91.7 2.7 5.6 0.0
Posner 1244 91.5 3.0 4.8 0.7
Tacha 759 97.5 0.8 1.6 0.1
Average 86.1 6.7 6.8 1.5
In addition to information about individual judges, I sought information
about the overall pattern of separate opinions in various circuits. I did not
discover any quick way to search circuit files for separate opinions akin to
that used for searching for separate opinions by individual judges. 7 So my
research assistant searched all Fifth Circuit and all-circuit opinions, not
78. Lexis would not search "dissentby (!)," saying that a universal symbol is an inappro-
priate subject for that search. Nor would Lexis "see" the "words" "dissentby" and "concurby"
in opinions although they are present in the Lexis versions of the opinions.
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unpublished and not per curiam, released in the month of April in eight
sample years. The results are shown in Tables 18 and 19.
Table 18. Separate Opinions in Fifth Circuit Samples Over Time
No. of Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
Opinions Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
1960 47 85.1 4.3 8.5 2.1
1965 28 85.7 3.6 7.1 3.6
1970 78 89.7 2.6 7.7 0.0
1975 86 83.7 5.8 10.5 0.0
1980 125 84.8 4.8 9.6 0.8
1985 121 93.4 2.5 2.5 1.7
199079 80 93.7 2.5 3.8 0.0
1995 48 89.6 4.2 4.2 2.1
Table 19. Separate Opinions in All-Circuit Samples Over Time
No. of Percent Percent Percent Percent Con.
Opinions Majority Concur Dissent and Dis.
1960 213 91.1 2.8 5.2 0.9
1965 243 89.7 3.7 5.3 1.2
1970 357 92.2 2.5 5.0 0.3
1975 360 88.1 4.2 6.4 1.4
1980 662 92.9 2.0 4.4 0.8
1985 606 91.4 2.1 5.6 0.8
1990 893 95.2 1.5 3.9 0.6
1995 752 94.8 2.0 2.7 0.4
Several general points seem worth making from this data. The first is
the unsurprising point that circuit judges, or at least this possibly unrepre-
sentative sample of them, do behave differently from Supreme Court jus-
tices. Apart from Chief Justice Warren, who rarely wrote opinions of any
kind, the justice who wrote majorities most often - Justice Black at 54% -
79. The 1990 and 1995 figures for the Fifth Circuit conceal an increase in the number
of cases found in Lexis because a large percentage of the total cases found in Lexis in April
of those years were unpublished. In April 1990, Lexis contained 170 unpublished Fifth
Circuit majority opinions plus another 43 per curiam opinions, in addition to the 75 signed,
published opinions counted for this table. For April 1995 there were 159 unpublished major-
ity opinions and 21 per curiamn opinions to complement the 43 published, signed opinions.
By contrast, the sample picked up 14 unpublished majority opinions in April 1985 and none
before that date. Many of the earlier months had sizeable numbers of published per curiam
opinions: 9 in 1985, 151 in 1980, 37 in 1975, 96 in 1970, 27 in 1965, and 18 in 1960.
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did so less often than the circuit judge who wrote majorities least often -
Judge MacKinnon at 56%.1
Second, courts of appeals judges differ substantially in their willingness
to write separately. The highest percentage of majority opinions found were
Judge Tacha at 97.5%, Judge Politz at 95.1%, and Judge Coffin at 95.0%; the
lowest was Judge MacKirmon at 56.0%. Almost all judges write more dis-
senting opinions than concurring opinions, but not all.8 '
Third, the data provide at least some evidence that circuits have different
patterns of writing separate opinions. Specifically, the judges sampled from
the Ninth and the District of Columbia Circuits seem to write separately much
more often than those from the Fifth or the other circuits. Although the Fifth
Circuit judges sampled wrote separately less frequently than those from the
Ninth or the D.C. Circuits, they wrote separately about as much as the "other
circuit" sample - 84.8% to 86.1%. On the other hand, in the April samples,
the Fifth Circuit wrote separately more frequently than the "all circuit" sample
in every year except 1985 and substantially more in many years, particularly
the earlier ones. The apparent differences among circuits raise several gen-
eral questions. Are the differences real or just artifacts of these searches? If
real, are they stable over time? And, if they are both real and stable, what
causes them: something about the kinds of cases presented to different cir-
cuits, something in the decision-making process in different circuits, or some-
thing in the "culture" of the circuit? These are interesting questions for future
exploration.
Based on the data, Judge Wisdom has written separate opinions fairly
rarely in comparison to other judges on his circuit, at least until the last ten
years. This difference is even greater compared to many other prominent
circuit judges. The difference is most marked for concurrences, where Judge
Wisdom is the third least likely circuit judge in the sample to write separate
concurrences. His concurrences come at about half the rate for his circuit in
general. Judge Wisdom's dissents are fewer than average, but much closer to
his circuit's average than his concurrences.
80. Three of the four justices who wrote separately least often were Chief Justices -
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist. Not counting his opinions as associate justice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has written majority opinions 66% of the time. It would be interesting to see if chief
judges in the circuits or chief justices in state supreme courts display a similar bias towards
majority opinions.
81. The category of "concurring and dissenting" opinions is included to avoid double
counting because Lexis sometimes categorizes the same opinion by a judge as both a "dissentby"
and a "concurby". The grounds on which Lexis makes that determination were not clear to me
nor are the grounds on which a judge decides to call an opinion that dissents in part an opinion
"concurring and dissenting." This category seemed to have little meaning and perhaps should be
included in the column with dissents.
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Overall, Judge Wisdom's separate opinion profile seems most like that
of his old friend Judge Tuttle of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, Judge Good-
win of the Ninth Circuit, and Judges Cummings and Posner of the Seventh
Circuit. Each of those judges writes separately about 10% of the time and
writes separate concurrences quite infrequently. Beyond the fact that all those
judges are well respected, it is hard to find other similarities between them.
B. Length of Opinions
When I got all of Judge Wisdom's opinions in my computer as word
processing files, I realized that my "word count" command could tell me how
long they were. I therefore began counting the number of words in all of
Judge Wisdom's majority court of appeals opinions' only to discover that this
was not an easy task. 3 As a result, I decided to analyze all of Judge Wis-
dom's majority court of appeals opinions for eight sample years: 1960, 1965,
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. Table 20 shows the results.
Table 20. Length of Judge Wisdom's Majority Opinions: Selected Years










Two points leap out from Table 20. The first is how consistent in aver-
age length Judge Wisdom's opinions have been over time. At both the early
82. Dissenting and concurring opinions have such different structures and purposes from
majority opinions that I did not want to include them with the majority opinions. The same is true
of the opinions Judge Wisdom wrote for three-judge district courts, the Multidistrict Litigation
Panel, and the Railroad Court.
83. Counting words was more difficult than I expected for two reasons. First, in order to
get Wisdom majority opinions only, I had to eliminate from my data files (for purposes of the
count) all Wisdom separate opinions and all separate opinions to Wisdom opinions. For the
comparison opinions, I had to remove all separate opinions. Even then, the Lexis software I used
downloaded the opinions with Lexis headers at each page and the original page numbers, in
brackets, when those pages had been changed. (Some, but not all, of these can now be eliminated
by new Lexis software), All of these, plus the opening information about the case, were counted
as "words" of the opinion. I estimate that, on average, 300 "words" were added to each opinion.
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and the late parts of his career, his opinions were about 3,420 words long;
four of the eight data points differ from that number by less than 1.5 % and a
fifth by about 5 %. One might have expected that published opinions would,
on average, get longer over this period, either from the increasing relegation
by all courts of appeals of simpler cases to unpublished opinions or the in-
creasing complexity and size of the statutory, regulatory, and judicial law to
be considered. Instead, Judge Wisdom's opinions are of almost exactly the
same length in the first and last thirds of his career.
The second observation is that the middle data points - 1975, 1980, and
1985 - are different. Judge Wisdom's 1975 opinions were nearly 75%
longer than his average for the first and last periods. His 1980 opinions were
about 15% longer and his 1985 opinions were nearly 50% longer. I have re-
examined the cases for those years and do not find any one or two particularly
long opinions that inflate the averages. Were the issues that much more
complicated?
There is another plausible explanation: law clerks. Judge Wisdom had
one law clerk each year from 1958 through 1964. For the years beginning in
1965 through 1972, he had two clerks. With the addition of the Railroad
Court to his load as an active judge, Judge Wisdom had four law clerks each
year from 1973 to 1976. After taking senior status, he went down to three
clerks in 1977 and down to two clerks (for the most part) beginning in the late
summer of 1985.'
Of the eight years examined, in one year Judge Wisdom had one law
clerk, in four years he had two, in one year he had the equivalent of about 2.7
(as it was a transition from three law clerks, ending in July or August, to two
law clerks thereafter), in one year he had three, and in one year he had four.
As shown in Table 21, below, the length of the opinions correlates almost
perfectly with the number of law clerks.
Table 21. Average Opinion Length Compared with Number of Law Clerks
Rank Year Average Length No. of Clerks
8 1960 3,240 1
7 1965 3,376 2
6 1970 3,407 2
5 1990 3,436 2
4 1995 3,459 2
3 1980 3,955 3
2 1985 4,788 2.7
1 1975 6,040 4
84. I based this data on a directory of law clerks, secretaries, interns, and families that
Judge Wisdom's office prepared (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Judge Wisdom's clerks typically prepare first drafts of some, but not all,
of his opinions. If the number of clerks grew faster than the number of cases,
clerks might make their first drafts longer. Whether the majority opinions of
other judges show a similar effect could be an interesting future project.'
I next compared the lengths of Judge Wisdom's majority opinions to
those of other circuit judges. To do this, I downloaded a sample of about 25
to 60 published, non-per curiam majority opinions from the same years for
both the Fifth Circuit and the Courts of Appeals as a whole.A6 Table 22 shows
the results, with the Wisdom data from Table 20 included for ease of compari-
son.
Table 22. Average Length of Published, Non-Per Curiam
Majority Opinions
Judge Wisdom Fifth Circuit Sample All-Circuit Sample
No.-of Words per No. of Words per No. of Words per
Opinions Opinion Opinions Opinion Opinions Opinion
1960 37 3,240 33 2,350 44 2,467
1965 32 3,376 57 3,061 49 2,397
1970 44 3,407 58 2,901 42 3,044
1975 35 6,040 48 3,641 41 3,680
1980 25 3,955 45 3,856 47 3,585
1985 33 4,788 31 5,208 49 3,771
1990 26 3,436 48 3,270 58 3,807
1995 14 3,459 27 4,354 22 3,561
These are fairly small samples of both Fifth Circuit and all-circuit opin-
ions, and they were not selected in a rigorous manner. 8 I have not tried to
assess their statistical significance. For what they are worth, they do show a
marked overall increase in the length of appellate opinions over time, with the
length nearly doubling in the Fifth Circuit and increasing by almost 50%
across the circuits. Most of the change in the all-circuit sample had occurred
by 1975; the Fifth Circuit sample was substantially longer than the all-circuit
sample for both 1985 and 1995.
85. Such a project would require, however, information about the number of clerks
employed by the sampled judges in various years that could probably be obtained easily only
from those judges' chambers.
86. These samples were not meant to be separate so there are some Fifth Circuit
opinions and even some opinions by Judge Wisdom in the overall circuit sample.
87. I chose opinions by downloading all opinions released on particular days. The
number and identity of the days I chose varied from sample to sample.
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After being substantially longer than both Fifth Circuit majority opin-
ions and circuit opinions in general through 1980, Judge Wisdom's opinions
have fallen back to about the overall average, which seems somewhat lower
than the Fifth Circuit average. The average number of law clerks per circuit
judge probably expanded during this period, which may have played a part
in the overall trends. Judge Wisdom, by contrast, has had fewer clerks in
recent years.
C. Footnotes
The footnote enjoys an odd, almost talismanic, significance in the legal
world. Differences in the number of footnotes used by different legal
authors -judicial, academic, or student - can reflect many things: different
views about what is relevant, about what should go into text, about how
often to put different authorities into one note, about how often to footnote
the same authority in a passage, or just different sporting urges.' It is
possible, and perhaps even plausible, that the number of footnotes used does,
overall, indicate something about a judge's use of authority. It is possible,
for example, that an opinion with many footnotes might be viewed as more
"scholarly." A close examination of the kinds of materials cited in the
opinions - cases, law review articles, other scholarship - might have been
more revealing, but as I was already counting the number of words, I de-
cided to count the number of footnotes in the sampled cases as well. Table
23, next page, shows the results for Judge Wisdom, the Fifth Circuit sample,
and the all-circuits sample. These results are both the average number of
footnotes per opinion and the average per 1,000 words of each opinion.
(Otherwise, changes in the lengths of opinion might affect the number of
footnotes without changing the "density" of footnote use.)
It is hard to find patterns in this data. There is no clear consistent trend
in the number of footnotes per 1,000 words. The Fifth Circuit seems to
footnote more than the all-circuit sample. Judge Wisdom seems, for most
of his career, to footnote at about the same rate as the rest of the Fifth
Circuit.
88. Professor Arthur Austin has published several articles on the uses and abuses of
footnotes in legal scholarship. See Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation,
40 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1987); Arthur D. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad
Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L. Rsv. 1009 (1990); Arthur D. Austin, Political Correctness Is a
Footnote, 71 OR. L. REv. 543 (1992); and Arthur D. Austin, The Reliability of Citation
Counts in Judgments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 829 (1993). As
to sport, see David A. Kaplan, The Article in a Law Review That Included the Most Footnotes
Is. . ., NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 4.
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Table 23. Average Number of Footnotes and Footnotes per
Thousand Words in Published Majority Opinions
Judge Wisdom Fifth Circuit Sample All-Circuit Sample
Fns per per 1,000 Fns per per 1,000 Fns per per 1,000
Opinion Words Opinion Words Opinion Words
1960 5.5 1.7 4.5 1.9 3.0 1.2
1965 7.4 2.2 7.2 2.4 4.1 1.7
1970 5.9 1.7 6.7 2.3 3.0 1.0
1975 9.8 1.6 6.0 1.7 7.3 2.0
1980 8.8 2.2 6.2 1.6 6.6 1.8
1985 9.1 1.9 15.1 2.9 5.0 1.3
1990 19.9 5.8 6.1 1.9 5.0 1.3
1995 24.5 7.1 9.8 2.3 3.4 1.0
The only real surprise in the table is the last two data points for Judge
Wisdom. In 1990 and in 1995, his opinions contained far more footnotes
than earlier in his career, both absolutely and on a per word basis. It is hard
to know what accounts for this, as the cases do not appear obviously more
complex, and the opinions are no longer than those from earlier in his
career. One speculative possibility is that Judge Wisdom may have given his
recent law clerks more discretion in adding footnotes than he gave earlier
clerks. As his law clerks were almost always law review editors just before
beginning their clerkships, given greater latitude they may have chosen to
add more footnotes.
IV. Citations to the Opinions
The previous section looked at Judge Wisdom's opinions themselves
and asked what could be learned from them over time and in comparison to
samples of similar opinions. This section looks at how, and how often,
Judge Wisdom's opinions have been used by others. It examines the median
number of citations to his majority opinions, both inside the circuit from
which they were issued and in other contexts. (These other contexts include
not just other circuits, but the Supreme Court, state courts, law reviews, and
A.L.R. annotations.) It compares those averages over time and with cita-
tions to the majority opinions contained in the samples from the Fifth Circuit
and all circuits discussed above. Finally, it looks at which of Judge Wis-
dom's opinions have been cited most often and compares the results with
some traditional views of Judge Wisdom's most influential opinions.
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The work in this section is based on down-loaded files from the elec-
tronic version of Shepard's Federal Citations. As discussed in the Appen-
dix, using Shepard's has both advantages and disadvantages. Perhaps the
most notable disadvantage is that Shepard's does not track citations to
concurring or dissenting opinions. Thus, this analysis misses some of
Judge Wisdom's most famous opinions, such as his dissents in Dombrowski
v. Pfister,8 9 United States v. Barnett,' In re Unterweser Reederei,9' and
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,' and his concurrence in
United States v. Cox.93 This assessment, therefore, is limited to Judge
Wisdom's majority opinions for the courts of appeals.94
A. Citations to Wisdom Majority Opinions: Trends and Comparisons
Table 24 shows the basic data: the median number of citations for the
majority opinions written by Judge Wisdom in each year from 1958 to
1995. The table distinguishes between citations by federal courts, district
or appellate, within the circuit, and total citations inside and outside the
circuit. It also includes the average of the medians for both in circuit and
total citations for five year periods during his career. 95
Analyzing citation frequency is particularly difficult as two counter-
vailing trends are at work. The longer the time since a case was published,
the greater the opportunity - the more subsequent opinions - for it to be
cited. On the other hand, most citations come, if at all, relatively quickly,
89. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).
91. 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated,
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
92. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
93. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
94. It excludes his district court, Multidistrict Litigation Panel, and Railroad Court
opinions as too rare, and, in the latter two cases, too unusual for sound useful comparisons.
It does include the many court of appeals opinions he has written for other circuits. In such
cases, the "in circuit" comparison refers to the circuit from whence the opinion was
published and not to the Fifth Circuit.
95. I used the median rather than the mean to avoid allowing the rare hugely cited
case to change the average dramatically. The difference between a case with 50 citations
and one with 250 citations will not change the median in any of these years, but it would
add four to ten citations to a mean. My interest in long term trends seemed to dictate using
the medians.
96. Only 12 of the majority opinions for 1995 are included because only those had
appeared in the electronic version of Shepard's as of November 5, 1995.
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Table 24. Median Number of Citations to











1958 6 20 42
1959 8 18.5 50 7 19.2
1960 7 19 37
1961 6 19 54
1962 8.5 23 47
1963 7 24 39 7.4 24.9
1964 5.5 23.5 26
1965 10 33 33
1966 6 15 36
1967 7.5 28.5 26
1968 15 29 29 9.7 24.3
1969 10 20 34
1970 10 29 44
1971 8 19 47
1972 9 22 45
1973 11 29 37 9.8 28.3
1974 10 31.5 48
1975 11 40 35
1976 17 50 21
1977 14 37 36
1978 10 32.5 28 10.4 32.3
1979 8 29 33
1980 3 13 23
1981 7 22 25
1982 8 25 25
1983 9.5 21.5 24 8.7 24.1
1984 11 30.5 32
1985 8 21.5 34
1986 7 15 23
1987 7 13.5 30
1988 5 13.5 22 5.1 11.7
1989 2 7 17
1990 4.5 9.5 26
1991 4.5 6.5 22
1992 2 5 22
1993 3 4 15 2.1 3.7
1994 1 3 28
1995 0 0 12 _ 1_ _
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and older cases were published in an environment that contained far fewer
judges and law reviews. 97 Citations to Judge Wisdom's opinions show both
effects. The number of citations generally climbs through the 1950s and
1960s, peaks in the 1970s, and declines, at first slowly and then precipi-
tously, in the 1980s and 1990s.
More consistent, however, has been the percentage of "in circuit" cita-
tions among total citations. In the periodic averages, this percentage varied
between 29.7% and 36.5% with no discernible trend until the last two
periods, when the percentage climbed first to 43.6% and then to 56.8%.
Table 25 adds the data from the samples of majority opinions from the
Fifth Circuit and all circuits for eight selected years. (For ease of compari-
son, Judge Wisdom's figures are repeated in this table.)
Table 25. Median Citations for Majority Opinions During Year
Judge Wisdom Fifth Circuit Sample All-Circuit Sample
Median in Median Median in Median Median in Median
Circuit Total Circuit Total Circuit Total
1959 7 19.2 2 7 5 13.5
1963 7.4 24.9 5 12 5 16
1968 9.7 24.3 5 13 3 14
1973 9.8 28.3 5 16 4.5 11.5
1978 10.4 32.3 4 11 6 21
1983 8.7 24.1 9 19 7 19
1988 5.1 11.7 6 12 6 15
1993 2.1 3.7 2 4 4 5
This table demonstrates that from his earliest opinions through those
of the mid-1980s, Judge Wisdom's opinions have been cited much more
often than either those of his Fifth Circuit colleagues or those of the all-
circuit sample. Table 26 shows the ratios.
97. See the discussions of this point in Landes et al., supra note 3 and Chicago Council
of Lawyers, supra note 34, at app. (discussing effect of fewer judges and law reviews on
citation likelihood).
98. The numbers for Judge Wisdom are the means of the median citations for the
periods 1957-1960, 1961-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990,
1991-1995.
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Table 26. Ratio of Median Citations to Wisdom Opinions to
Median Citations to Fifth and All-Circuit Samples
Wisdom to Fifth Circuit Wisdom to All-Circuit
Sample Sample
In Circuit Total n Circuit Total
1959 3.5 2.7 1.4 1.4
1963 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.6
1968 1.9 1.9 3.2 1.7
1973 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.5
1978 2.6 2.9 1.7 1.5
1983 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3
1988 0.9 1.0 0.9 .8
1993 1.1 0.9 0.5 .7
Compared with other Fifth Circuit opinions, the difference between
citations to Wisdom opinions and other opinions was greatest for opinions
written in the very earliest period of Judge Wisdom's service on the court. 99
It is not clear that the first period, comprising only 1958, 1959, and 1960,
plus three opinions from 1957, should be given as much weight as later
periods, but Wisdom opinions from throughout the 1960s have been cited
from 50% to 110% more frequently than those of other Fifth Circuit
judges. The citation rates then peaked again for opinions from the 1970s,
which were generally cited more than twice as often as those of other Fifth
Circuit judges. Judge Wisdom's post-1980 opinions, however, have been
cited at a nearly average rate. Both citations within the Fifth Circuit and
total citations followed the same general pattern.1  Thus, to the extent that
99. Note that this analysis is based on the date of the opinion cited, not the date of the
opinion citing it. One might also want to see if the number of citations to Wisdom opinions
of a particular vintage, compared to citations to other judge's opinions of the same vintage,
changed over time. Such an analysis is feasible, though not easy. Given that most citations
to opinions come within the first few years, it seems unlikely that this approach would lead
to substantially different results, but it might. I have not attempted it for this article.
100. I have ignored the all-circuit sample in this analysis. The differences in ratios
between citations to Wisdom opinions and the Fifth Circuit sample and Wisdom opinions and
the all-circuit samples shows only differences between the Fifth Circuit and all-circuit
baselines. I did not know whether there was much difference between those baselines before
checking the citations. The differences exist, but they are not large and no trend is obvious.
The clearest difference is that for the first two time periods, there were fewer citations to
Fifth Circuit opinions. For purposes of measuring Judge Wisdom's reputation against that
of other judges, either sample would do and use of the Fifth Circuit baseline seems fairer in
measuring a Fifth Circuit judge. The actual analysis would be much the same using either
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one connects a judge's "good reputation" with number of citations relative to
other judges, this data suggests that Judge Wisdom's reputation immediately
was higher than average, peaked again in the 1970s, but, relative to his peers,
has declined to an average position since then."0'
This use of citation analysis is similar to that used by Judge Posner as
one measure of Cardozo's reputation."0 One part of his argument compared
the number of citations to Cardozo opinions to those of a sample of opinions
by his colleagues on the New York Court of Appeals. He found that Cardozo
opinions were cited by New York courts between one and a half and two
times as often as those from the sample; this was about the same ratio as that
between Wisdom opinions and those of his colleagues. Cardozo opinions
were cited by courts outside New York more than seven times as often as
those of Cardozo's colleagues - a far higher ratio than that found for Wisdom
opinions - but the nature of their respective judicial systems probably ac-
counts for this difference. Although Fifth Circuit opinions are not binding
precedents for courts in other federal circuits, all federal courts are interpret-
ing the same Constitution, statutes, regulations, and Supreme Court decisions.
State courts, when dealing with issues of federal law, will also have to apply
baseline. Compared with both, citations to Wisdom opinions started strong, peaked in the 1970s,
and declined to about average thereafter.
101. At least part of this is consistent with Landes et al., supra note 3, who find, after
adjusting raw citations in a variety of ways, that Judge Wisdom is one of the most frequently
cited judges on the courts of appeals, especially for citations out-of-circuit. The special fre-
quency of noncircuit citations in their analysis does not appear in my less sophisticated analysis,
although it might be expected.
As Landes, Lessig, and Solimine point out, citations from within an opinion's circuit may
not be as good evidence of the opinion's perceived merit as citations to it from other courts.
Within an opinion's circuit, the case may be cited as either binding precedent or persuasive
precedent. Outside the circuit, the case cannot be binding precedent but can only be a persuasive
precedent, whether it is cited by a federal court or a state court. That a citing court finds the
opinion persuasive may be higher evidence of its quality than that a citing court finds the opinion
binding. My data also includes citations to law reviews and annotations. Those also might be
given more value than "in circuit" citations. Although the article or annotation may cite an
opinion as the binding precedent of the circuit involved or as a persuasive precedent, the mere
fact that it is noted in such a publication might be seen as evidence that it is an unusually impor-
tant decision.
One might expect, therefore, that a more prestigious judge would have even more total
citations, compared with his peers, than citations within the circuit. This does not seem to be
the case with the Wisdom citation data. For some time periods, the ratios between total citations
to Wisdom opinions and total citations to those in the Fifth Circuit and all-circuits samples are
higher than those for in circuit citations, for others they are lower. Overall, of the 16 possible
comparisons (each of the eight time periods or test years, both with the Fifth Circuit and the all-
circuits samples), the ratios are higher for total citations seven times, lower for total citations
seven times, and the same twice.
102. POSNER, supra note 3, at 80-90.
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the same authorities. Most state law, by contrast, is unique to the individual
state. Thus, citations to a state court opinion from outside that state (or the
federal courts in that state) likely will be much rarer than citations to one
federal circuit's opinions in other courts, thus depressing the number of "other
court" citations to less famous state judges.
Why has the rate with which Wisdom opinions are cited relative to those
of other judges declined for opinions written after the 1970s? Several theories
could be advanced. One might argue that changes in the politics of the federal
bench have led to more conservative judges who are less willing to cite Wis-
dom majority opinions, either because the opinions differ, in reasoning or
results, from their view of the proper law, or because Judge Wisdom's reputa-
tion is poorer with more conservative judges. Another possibility concerns
case assignment. Who writes the majority opinion is decided generally by the
senior active judge on a panel. Judge Wisdom, as a senior judge, has not had
the assignment privilege since 1976. The assigning judges since then may
have assigned him less interesting or challenging majority opinions - out of
concern for Judge Wisdom's age or health, out of concern for the way Judge
Wisdom would write the opinion, or out of a desire to keep a challenging
opinion for himself or herself. Finally, it is possible that the quality of the
opinions has declined.
There is another, more testable, theory, which is both plausible and
wrong. Since 1980, only 259 of his 357 majority opinions have been written
for the Fifth Circuit. Before that time, only 755 of his 767 majority opinions
were written for other circuits. If Wisdom's non-Fifth Circuit majority
opinions are, on average, cited less frequently than his Fifth Circuit majority
opinions, that may explain part or all of this apparent decline. In fact, how-
ever, as Table 27 shows, his opinions outside the Fifth Circuit have actually
been cited more frequently than those from within the Circuit, particularly
since 1985.
Table 27. Median Total Citations to Fifth Circuit, Non-Fifth
Circuit, and Total Judge Wisdom Opinions"0 3
Fifth Circuit Non-Fifth Circuit Total
1981-1985 23 25.5 24.1
1986-1990 10.5 16 11.7
1991-1992 5 15 5.8
103. The figure given for the "total" is not the median for all the opinions during that
period, but, as in Tables 24 and 25, the mean of the medians for each of those three periods.
As Judge Wisdom has not written any majority opinions for other courts of appeals since 1992,
I excluded 1993-95 from the analysis.
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One might suspect that presiding judges on panels from other circuits
would be more likely to assign important cases to an honored visiting judge,
but that seems speculative and probably unprovable. Other than demonstrat-
ing that the relative decline in citations to Wisdom opinions has been concen-
trated in the Fifth Circuit opinions, these data do not seem to be much help
in understanding the change they highlight.
The collected citation data can help answer at least one other interesting
question: Does the existence of dissenting opinions affect how often a major-
ity opinion is cited? One might have two different hypotheses. The exis-
tence of a concurring or dissenting opinion might weaken a majority opinion
by throwing doubt on its reasoning or result. On the other hand, it could
be that dissenting opinions are more likely in more controversial, important,
or interesting cases, which may in turn be cited more often. More specifi-
cally, one might wonder whether dissenting opinions by Judge Wisdom
had a particularly strong effect in weakening the majority. To examine
these questions, I analyzed the median number of total citations both to
opinions where Judge Wisdom wrote a dissenting opinion and to opinions
where Judge Wisdom wrote the majority and someone else wrote a dissent.
The results, along the median number of total citations for all Wisdom and
Fifth Circuit majority opinions for comparison, are shown in Table 28,
below.
Table 28. Median Total Citations to Cases with Wisdom Dissents or with
Wisdom Majorities and Others' Dissents
Citations to Citations to Citations to Citations to 5th
Cases with WisdomWisd MajorWisdom All Wisdom Circuit SampleWisdom Majorities Majorities Majorities
Dissents with Dissents
1957-1960 20 12 19.2 7
1961-1965 20 22.5 24.9 12
1966-1970 9 46 24.3 13
1971-1975 41 29 28.3 16
1976-1980 29.5 24.5 32.3 11
1981-1985 49 18 24.1 19
1986-1990 26.5 28 11.7 12
The numbers of opinions in any one box is fairly small - they range
from 4 cases to 24 cases. (I excluded 1991-1995 entirely as there were only
four dissenting opinions by Judge Wisdom and four to him during that
period.) As a result, the medians jump around. Overall, the median number
of citations to Wisdom majority opinions does not seem to differ very much
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when there is a dissenting opinion. The majorities with dissents are cited
substantially more often in the late 1960s and late 1980s and somewhat less
often in the late 1950s, late 1970s, and early 1980s. The Fifth Circuit ma-
jority opinions where Judge Wisdom dissented, however, are cited much
more often than the relevant Fifth Circuit samples. They are cited more than
twice as often for every period except the late 1960s, when they are cited
less frequently than the sample opinions. Decisions to which Judge Wisdom
dissented attracted more attention, but we cannot say why from this data.
It may be that Judge Wisdom dissented disproportionately in cases that were
more important than usual; it may also be that the increased number of
citations of a case reflect en bane consideration, Supreme Court action, or
disapproving citations. Further analysis of the data is necessary before
drawing any conclusions.
B. Most Cited Opinions
Finally, I looked at citations to Wisdom opinions to see which opinions
of his were cited most frequently in their respective eras. Table 29 shows
the twelve Wisdom opinions with the most total citations compared with
other Wisdom Opinions from their periods; Table 30 shows the twelve with
the most citations within the Fifth Circuit. I have excluded from both tables
cases decided after 1990 because the number of citations for these cases, and
the median numbers of citations, are so low.
These twelve cases represent slightly more than the top 1 % of Judge
Wisdom's 1,113 majority court of appeals opinions from before 1991. For
both tables, the rank of the opinions is determined not by the raw number of
citations but by the ratio of the raw number to the average number of cita-
tions, total and within circuit, to Wisdom opinions during the relevant
period. 104
104. This is, admittedly, an imperfect solution to a real problem. The problem of com-
paring the number of citations to opinions from different eras is that the opportunities to be
cited have varied, as noted above. One solution, adopted by Lessig in his Seventh Circuit
analysis, was to look at citations per year. That only works if the opportunity to be cited in-
creases as a linear function of the number of years. The evidence in this paper indicates that,
at least over this period, the opportunity to be cited did not increase for Judge Wisdom, the
Fifth Circuit, or all circuits. Opinions about 10 to 25 years old were most likely to be cited.
I have used the average medians over five year time periods. This has two problems.
The more obvious is that not every year within the time period has the same median. The
more subtle is that this assumes that the distribution of opinions around the median stays the
same over time. I suspect that, for older cases, the standard deviation of the distributions are
greater, meaning the heavily cited cases are more heavily cited. This could be solved by
looking at how many standard deviations from the mean the cases fell, but the importance of
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Table 30. The Twelve Wisdom Opinions Most Frequently
Cited Within Their Circuit
Case
330 Robison v. Offshore Co.,
266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)
169 MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960)
234 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,








getting a "correct" ranking of these opinions has not seemed to justify the work that would
involve.
604 Robison v. Offshore Co.,
266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)
343 Wood v. Wood,
825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987)
477 MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960)
447 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966)
459 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
387 Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969)
319 Reyes v. Wyeth Lab.,
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)
267 De Luna v. United States,
308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962)
244 Amador-Gonzales v. United States,
391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968)
308 United States v. Gipson,
553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977)
249 United States v. Warner,
441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971)
218 Northwestern Nat. Casualty Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)
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4 23.1 226 United States v. Warner,
441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971)
5 15.7 152 Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969)
6 14.7 75 Wood v. Wood,
825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987)
7 13.8 102 Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight,
505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974)
8 12.0 104 Whitney v. Schweiker,
695 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1982)
9 11.3 98 Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States,
733 F.2d 873 (Fed Cir. 1984)
10 11.2 57 United States v. Gonzales-Sanchez,
825 F.2d 572 (1st Cir. 1987)
11 10.4 90 Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co.,
507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975)
12 10.3 107 James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.,
559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977)
These are not just lists of "the usual suspects," although some of Judge
Wisdom's most famous cases are highly ranked. Robison, in the context of
a mobile off-shore drilling rig, established the rule for defining a "seaman"
under the Jones Act, which provides a remedy for injured seamen but not for
others on vessels. Jefferson County was the key precedent with which the
Fifth Circuit finally, more than a decade after Brown v. Board of Education,
moved to desegregate public education in the Deep South. Local 189 was
a crucial early employment discrimination case under Title VII. Borel was
the first case to hold an employer liable for its failure to warn an employee
of the dangers of asbestos exposure. But many of the other cases have little,
if any, fame.
In an earlier symposium on Judge Wisdom, Professor Harvey Couch,
a historian of the Fifth Circuit, discussed fourteen noteworthy Wisdom opin-
ions."° Couch first noted that other symposium authors were discussing four
important Wisdom opinions: Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District" - an important school desegregation case - Jefferson County,
Robison, and the three-judge district court voting rights decision in United
States v. Louisiana." Only three of those cases are appellate and within the
105. Harvey Couch, A Small Sampling of Judge Wisdom's "Other" Opinions, 60 TUL.
L. REv. 356 (1985).
106. 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965).
107. 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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scope of the present study; one of those three, Singleton, was not among
the most cited cases. (Singleton, decided in 1965, has been cited only 40
times, and only 25 of those within the Fifth Circuit.) Of the fourteen he
then discussed, eight were separate opinions and hence cannot be tracked
through Shepard's.'0 8 Of the remaining six cases, only three are among
Judge Wisdom's most cited cases: DeLuna, Local 189, and Borel. The
other three cases, Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,109
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, ° and Plante v. Gonzalez,"'
although fairly well cited, fall well short of making either list. 
112
Of the cases that made the lists, many are relatively unknown. This
may reflect the areas of law in which I work, but before starting this re-
search, I had never heard of Wood, MacKenna, De Luna, Amador-Gonza-
les, Gipson, Warner, Northwestern National, Whitney, Jarvis Clark Co.,
or Gonzales, in spite of taking a more than usual interest in Judge Wis-
dom's opinions.
The differences between the lists point out another interesting aspect
of citations to Wisdom opinions. The types of sources that cite the opinions
often differ substantially. A few of the listed opinions, notably Robison,
Wood v. Wood,113 Jefferson County, Local 189, and Borel, are extensively
108. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987 (1982), rev'd en banc, 729 F.2d
1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) '(Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888 (1970)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting), aff'd en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissent-
ing), vacated sub nom. Breman v. Zapata Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); McKenna v. Wallis,
344 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1964) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); United States v. Stapf,
309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); United
Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 308 F.2d 484 (1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd, 358
F.2d 714 (5th Cir.) (adopting Wisdom position), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
109. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (creating a "residual" hearsay exception, later codified
in FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5)).
110. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
433 U.S. 173 (1979) (striking down Idaho antitakeover statute after finding personal jurisdic-
tion over Idaho securities officials; reversed on grounds of improper venue).
111. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding Florida constitutional amendment
requiring substantial financial disclosure by certain elected officials), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979).
112. Dallas County was cited 171 times, for a ratio of 6.9; Great Western was cited 160
times, for a ratio of 5.0; Gonzales has been cited 143 times for a ratio 4.4.
113. Whether Wood v. Wood belongs on either list may be debated. It is a bankruptcy
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cited both inside and outside the Fifth Circuit, as is, at a lower level, James
v. Stockham Valve. On the other hand, the seventh through eleventh cases
on the "Within Circuit" list do not appear on the "All Citations" list and the
seventh through tenth cases, plus the twelfth, on the "All Citations" list do
not make the "Within Circuit" list.
For some cases, the discrepancies between their treatment within the
circuit and outside it are dramatic. United States v. Warner, for example,
although it appears on both lists, does so by virtue of its citation in the Fifth
Circuit: 226 of its 249 citations are within the circuit. Not surprisingly,
the case is "circuit precedent" for a common point: "On a motion for
judgment of acquittal, the test is whether, taking the view most favorable
to the Government, a reasonably minded jury could accept the relevant
evidence as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."" 4  Other circuits have their
own cases to cite for the same legal point. Similarly, Jarvis Clark Co.
v. United States is a Federal Circuit trade case. Fully 98 of its 100 cita-
tions are from within the Federal Circuit and its Court of International
Trade.
Equally dramatic differences run in the other direction, particularly
with criminal cases. Amador-Gonzales v. United States is a criminal proce-
dure case concerning the constitutionality of a car search after a stop and
the admissibility of a confession that flowed from the search. Of the 244
times it was cited, 148 were from state courts; only 33 were from the Fifth
Circuit. De Luna v. United States, a criminal case involving the privilege
against self-incrimination, was cited 267 times overall: 13 times in law
reviews and annotations, 100 times in state courts, and 154 times in federal
courts, but only 45 times in the Fifth Circuit.
In United States v. Gipson,"5 another criminal case, the court con-
fronted a novel question about unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases:
Where a single criminal statute prohibits a number of acts, and a finding
by the jury that the defendant did any one of the prohibited acts is suffi-
cient to convict him (provided, of course, that all other elements of the
offense are found), is the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict in-
case and 262 of the 343 citations to it were from the Bankruptcy Reporter. Both the size of
the bankruptcy courts and the extent their cases are reported have expanded substantially in
recent years.
114. United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829
(1971).
115. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
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fringed if a guilty verdict is returned when all members of the jury agree
that the defendant performed one of the prohibited acts, but disagree as to
which of the acts he performed?"6
Gipson has been cited 203 times in state courts, 98 times in federal courts,
but only 20 times in the Fifth Circuit.
Some of these differences seem attributable to the nature of the cases.
Criminal cases, particularly those involving constitutional criminal proce-
dure, may be cited frequently by state courts, adding greatly to the numbers
of citations. Employment discrimination cases are cited widely, but cases
involving the National Labor Relations Board rarely are cited by either
state courts or district courts. Most cases arising from NLRB actions go
directly to the Courts of Appeals; although Judge Wisdom has written in
more than 50 actions in which the Labor Board was a party, none makes
either top dozen list." 7 Bankruptcy cases now are cited widely in reported
Bankruptcy Court decisions; international trade decisions are restricted
almost totally to the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit.
These differences are important to using citation analysis to compare differ-
entjudges. A judge whose caseload contains a higher percentage of consti-
tutional criminal procedure issues may have more citations than a judge
whose caseload contains administrative appeals.
V. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Quantitative Analysis
Posner's chapter on measuring Cardozo's reputation begins by looking
for references to Cardozo in law reviews and comparing their number with
references to other leading figures." 8 His broadest count is reproduced
below:" 9
116. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. NLRB v. Cameo, 340 F.2d 803 (1965), however, would be thirteenth on the "in
circuit" list.
118. Posner also examines the use of Cardozo opinions in casebooks. I have not made
a similar survey for Wisdom opinions in casebooks. I suspect that a federal appellate judge
would have somewhat lower chances of ending up in a casebook than a judge on either a
state's highest court (for common-law courses) or on the United States Supreme Court (for
federal law courses, including especially constitutional law). I would note, however, that I
currently use teaching materials in two courses that include cases written by Judge Wisdom
in the 1980s, and neither course concerns civil rights or employment discrimination: Step-
Saver v. Wyse Technologies, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), in contracts, and Piney Woods
Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984) in Energy Law.
119. POSNER, supra note 3, at 78 (citing information in table 4). The table refers to the
second Justice John Marshall Harlan, a Supreme Court Justice from the 1950s to the early
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Table 31. Articles Mentioning Judges and Scholars
Brennan 2,716 Hand 679
Rehnquist 2,407 Jackson 660
Powell 2,257 Calabresi 656
Blackmun 1,985 Rawls 618
Burger 1,974 Wigmore 597
Holmes 1,820 Michelman 577
Frankfurter 1,553 Friendly 551
Tribe 1,456 Cardozo 499
Black 1,336 Bentham 499
Prosser 1,189 Coase 438
Harlan 1,154 Kant 365
Brandeis 1,120 Aristotle 356
Ely 1,110 Warren 320
Dworkin 1,031 Traynor 312
Blackstone 857 Nozick 279
Marshall 773 Schaefer 59
Last summer, I searched the "Lawrev" library and the "Allrev" file for
references to "judge w/3 wisdom," "j w/2 wisdom," "minor wisdom," or
"john w/2 wisdom." This probably missed some references to "Wisdom,"
standing alone, but it produced 602 articles. Of those, many turned out
to be using "the wisdom of the judges." After excluding the irrelevant
matches, I had 316 references. This seems to be a respectable total com-
pared with Judge Posner's list: Judge Wisdom ranks just above Justice
Traynor and just below Kant and Aristotle. Only two circuit judges,
Learned Hand and Henry Friendly, rank above him (although Posner does
note that his list is not exhaustive and some unlisted judges or scholars had
enough citations to be on it).
But this effort to fit Wisdom into Posner's previous work reveals
several of the problems of this method. First, this kind of work is hard to
reproduce. The databases from whence the data is drawn are not static -
they change. Posner's book on Cardozo was published in 1990; the work
that went into it must be six or more years old. During those six years,
more articles have been written, adding further citations to all the luminar-
ies in Table 31. My search for Wisdom citations in the summer of 1995 is
not comparable to Posner's searches five years earlier. If I wait to com-
1970s, not his grandfather of the same name, and to Justice John Marshall, not Justice
Thurgood Marshall.
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pare Judge Wisdom to the judges and scholars in Table 31, I have to run
all those searches again, thus undercutting one of the advantages of
incremental research. Or I could have searched for citations to Wisdom in
articles published before 1990, but if the database has added more back
issues of its journals or added back issues of new journals, even this solu-
tion fails. I cannot reproduce Posner's searches because I cannot reproduce
the database he examined.
Second, the research is hard to verify. Consider the problem of the
Washington and Lee Law Review staff. Some parts of this paper, particu-
larly Section I and the cases listed in Section IV, have citations that the
staff can check in the usual way. But the body of the paper is drawn from
over 60 megabytes of information in my computer's memory. My com-
puter is nearly 3,000 miles away and 60 megabytes is a lot of information
to transmit. With good technical advice, we might be able to make the
transfer through cyberspace, but we would still be likely to face problems
of translating the data from one type of software to another. Even if the
Law Review got my entire computer files, it would still have only my word
about what those files were and how I created them. Short of redoing all
my tedious hours of work in creating the files, it would not be able to
verify the facts on which the article is based. The DePaul Law Review
faced this same issue in publishing Professor Lessig's preliminary work on
the Seventh Circuit. It ended up disclaiming any responsibility for the
accuracy of the statistical information. 20
Of course, the Law Review staff could try to redo my work, but that
raises a third problem. The results of these searches depend exquisitely on
exactly how they are conducted. Look for "Wisdom w/2 Judge" and you
get a very different result than looking for "Wisdom w/3 Judge". To have
any chance of success, the putative reproducer would need the exact terms
of the searches; the precise identities of the databases searched (including
which libraries and files); and the dates, or in some cases, the times, all the
searches were conducted. That information is not impossible to record and
the database services even can make some of it relatively easy. But it needs
to be recorded and kept, and perhaps even published, with a fidelity more
akin to a scientist's laboratory notebooks than a law professor's notes.
These are questions about the mechanics of the research, but they are
not trivial. Quotation research makes its most useful contribution when the
facts that underpin it can be built upon, can be verified, and can be repro-
120. Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAuL L. REV. 673, 673 (1994).
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duced. When those facts are references to judicial opinions, law review
articles, and books, as they are in most legal research, these issues are
handled easily. Over the years, some law reviews have worked out ways
to handle empirical data concerning legal issues. But when the relevant
facts become bits (and bytes) of changeable and nonreproducible computer-
ized data, the issues become very difficult.
Still, these pragmatic problems are secondary to the greater issue
raised by this kind of work: What, if anything, does it mean? To return
to Judge Posner's table listing citations, as Judge Posner points out himself,
the list shows a number of strong biases. One bias relates to time. Modem
judges and authors are cited more often than older ones. The bigger bias,
though, seems to be the law review focus on constitutional law and the
Supreme Court as its arbiter. Supreme Court Justices, particularly sitting
justices, reach far greater levels than anyone else and, as Posner points out,
higher relative levels than anyone could reasonably support. Among aca-
demics, it overrepresents both constitutional scholars (Tribe, Ely, and
Dworkin) and the authors of common treatises (Prosser and Wigmore).
Looking at how often law reviews refer to individuals does not necessarily
tell you much about them, except that they did things law reviews like to
refer to. This is surely not very helpful. Even if one wants to study repu-
tation, the list provides an odd and skewed measure of reputation.
The study of judicial citations to judicial opinions may be more useful,
although even there it is hard to know what is being measured.12 1 Is Judge
A cited more than Judge B because she sits on a more prominent court?
Because of her extra-judicial writings or other fame? Because she has a
memorable name? (It surely did not hurt the fame of Learned Hand, Henry
Friendly, or John Minor Wisdom that their names were memorable.) Or
is she a better judge, one who writes better opinions? Many people are
interested in answering the last question about a vast array of judges.
Analysis of the frequency of citations may provide some support for an-
swering those questions, but much work needs to be done before anyone
can put much weight on it. Citation analysis to evaluate scholars, particu-
larly in the sciences, remains controversial even though a great deal of
work has been done to see if its results correspond to other measures of
scholarly ability. Almost none of that work has been done yet in law.
So, with all these problems, does the quantitative assessment of judi-
cial careers play any useful role? I believe that it may have some value in
121. Landes, Lessig, and Solimine have a useful discussion of a variety of objections to
citation analysis. Landes et al., supra note 3, at 2-7.
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comparing one judge with others, but that it clearly can help us understand
better the career of that particular judge. Discovering how rarely Judge
Wisdom writes separately compared with other judges, particularly given the
prominence of some of his dissents, has changed my view of how he works.
The length of his opinions and his use of footnotes indicate some things
about the stability of his approach to writing opinions, as well as his relation-
ships with his law clerks. The record of citations to his work seems to
indicate when other judges began to view him as special. The number of
citations to particular opinions helps show where his opinions have been read
and used and can help us trace a path of his influence, in particular fields or
particular courts.
To give one example, I spent some time determining whether law
review articles that were found in my searches discussed "Judge Wisdom"
or "the wisdom of judges. " While doing that, I made notes on the subjects
of about 200 of the articles, as far as I could tell the subjects from their
titles. I was not surprised that the greatest number, about 30%, dealt with
civil rights. I was surprised to find that the next three categories, each at
about 10%, were civil procedure, admiralty, and torts. That does not tell me
where Judge Wisdom ranks in the "Judicial Hall of Fame," but it did tell me
something about the effects of Judge Wisdom's work that I had not known.
In this way, quantitative assessment of judicial careers may add to our
knowledge about individual judges and courts. Such knowledge, in itself,
may or may not be very important, but given the legal world's continuing
fascination with judges, it cannot be called uninteresting.
Conclusion
I began this article as a test of whether quantitative analysis of judicial
opinions was both practicable and useful. I end it with two answers of
"qualified yes." And with a sense that I have learned more about Judge John
Minor Wisdom.
Even more, though, I have come away with more glimpses of the Judge
through reading snatches of the 46 megabytes, about 15,000 pages, of his
judicial opinions. His judicial career has made a difference to millions of
Americans in ways they will never know. It is a career built on intellectual
honesty and rigor, a commitment to justice, and a love of good English. It
is a career that our nation has been lucky to enjoy, and that, in small part,
I personally have been privileged to witness. I only hope I will be able to
continue downloading "Words of Wisdom" for many years to come.
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Appendix
This appendix does two things. First, it provides some advice for
others interested in this kind of research. Second, it describes in some detail
the way I conducted the research in this paper. It starts with six general
pieces of advice to anyone considering this kind of research.
Advice. First, do not even think about doing this kind of research
without largely free access to one of the legal databases and a fast data
connection. I estimate that I spent well more than 100 hours doing searches
and, consuming the greatest share of that time, downloading the results. I
have fast data access, but I downloaded more than 60 megabytes of informa-
tion.
Second, talk to representatives of the legal database firms about your
plans. I did not do this in detail and I regret it. I used Lexis rather than
Westlaw because I was trained on Lexis in 1976 and had never bothered to
learn the other system. My Lexis training since that time has been haphaz-
ard; in several places my research assistant was able to suggest newer search
techniques. I am confident that Lexis representatives would have been able
to improve my searches even more and I would like to have known ways in
which Westlaw might have offered alternatives.
Third, if your Lexis or Westlaw representative talks about upcoming
software, do not listen very seriously. I delayed my research several months
while waiting for promised new software for Lexis and the Macintosh.
Although some of it eventually appeared, it remained for a long time that
very common variety of software improvement - vaporware. Waiting for
it did me no good.
Fourth, do not rely entirely on your search results. Check everything.
Go into the data you have pulled up and test to see if it is really what you
were expecting. This operates on two levels. At one level, you need to
make sure that your search, in general, worked. I found, for example, that
excluding unpublished opinions from searches was difficult. Lexis had no
special tag for unpublished opinions, but it did generally insert language into
the case citations warning that circuit rules might limit their citation. Differ-
ent circuits asked Lexis to use different formulas; finding out how to exclude
unpublished opinions was a matter of trial and error. Similarly, I looked at
some of the citations when I searched for separate opinions by various circuit
judges in order to find out whether I was picking up other judges with the
same name. Those searches showed me that the Fifth Circuit had had two
judges named Jones and two judges named King, and that one of the judges
named King had started her judicial career under the name of Randall.
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At a deeper level, for some questions you will want to look at each case
individually. I ended up looking at each of the nearly 1,400 Wisdom opin-
ions I downloaded. I found that several of them were not, in fact, written
by Judge Wisdom, including a 1963 Seventh Circuit opinion that appeared
in my search for no discernible reason. I also found several cases where
Judge Wisdom was listed as writing separately when he did not or as writing
a dissent when he actually wrote the majority.
Fifth, document everything you do. The exact wording and date of a
search may turn out to be relevant, to you or someone else, in trying to
understand your results. Keep records of the wording of the searches you
use, the files you searched, and the dates you conducted them. I thought I
had done this carefully until I looked for my records at the end of the pro-
ject. Most of them were written on various pieces of paper, but were not
kept in any organized manner. Something like a laboratory notebook would
have been more useful.
Finally, be prepared for your research to twist and turn. You will
discover that some of the questions you thought would be interesting are not;
you will notice new questions that you will find interesting; and you will
come to be both impressed with and frustrated by the technology available.
These surprises are both enjoyable and dangerous. More than in most legal
research, you feel that your ending point is somewhat arbitrary; that, with
more time and effort, more could be done. At some point, declare victory
and retreat, perhaps to return to the data again in another article.
Methods. I started my research by collecting all of Judge Wisdom's
published opinions. I did so by searching the "Genfed" library in Lexis, in
the "Newer" file (which contains cases since 1944, well before the start of
Judge Wisdom's career), for any opinions "writtenby (Wisdom)." It listed
about 1,400 cases, which I downloaded, first in cite format and then, in
groups of two hundred or so at a time, in full format. The citation format
list became a basic resource. I printed out the list and put it, in chronologi-
cal order, into a three ring binder. I used the hard copy in the binder to
make notations about each case, ranging from the number of times it was
cited, to whether it was a separate Wisdom opinion, and to whether it was
really a Wisdom opinion at all. The citation format in the printout itself told
me for which court the opinion had been written.
Each of my seven downloaded full text files contained about 6 to 9
megabytes of information. I divided that data into a separate full text case
file for each year. I saved these more manageably sized files (about 1.5
megabyte each) in Word 6.1 format on my Macintosh. Because my Lexis
software for the Macintosh did not contain any filters or automatic format-
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ting features, I received the files in text only format, with carriage returns
at the end of every line and Lexis headers and star page numbers sprinkled
regularly throughout the text. This was a nuisance, but I had no good way
to fix it so the files have remained imperfect. (A Lexform routine for the
Macintosh has become available since then.)
I also did separate searches for "concurby (Wisdom)" and "dissentby
(Wisdom)". I downloaded the results in citation format to have a list of his
separate opinions. Eventually, I decided to check each full text case file to
verify that the concurring and dissenting opinions were listed properly. This
revealed some errors and made me realized that I had initially been counting
opinions that were both concurring and dissenting as two opinions rather
than one. I noted in my binder which opinions were concurring, dissenting,
and concurring and dissenting. Using that as a guide, I compiled Tables 1
through 7.
Tables 8 through 12 were built from the information in the binder,
supplemented with my information from the full text case files. I looked up
each Wisdom dissent in the full text files to sea, whether it was a dissent to
an en banc opinion and who had written the majority. I also searched the
full text files for the word "dissentby", and so found all the opinions where
Judge Wisdom had written a majority that generated a dissent.
The information in Tables 13 through 17 was both easy and difficult to
obtain. When I wanted a basis for comparing Judge Wisdom's use of sepa-
rate opinions to that of other judges, I quickly found I could get some infor-
mation easily. For example, five searches for "writtenby (Friendly)",
"opinionby (Friendly)", "concurby (Friendly)", and "dissentby (Friendly)"
gave me numbers of opinions quite rapidly and without requiring me to
download anything. I could just record the numbers and try again with
another judge.
I soon realized, however, that there were some problems. For judges
sitting after about 1985, there were sometimes numerous unpublished opin-
ions. Opinions that Lexis characterized as "concurring and dissenting"
appeared as two opinions "writtenby" the judge and as both a concurrence
and a dissent. And I discovered that duplicative judicial names were more
common than I had expected.
I solved the first problem by determining the formula used by Lexis to
warn readers of the unpublished nature of the opinion and incorporating that
in the search. This formula varied some from circuit to circuit. The most
common variation in the circuits I searched included language that circuit
rules "may limit the citation of unpublished opinions." For those circuits,
my search would include "and not limit citation unpublished." For other
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circuits, I would use other relevant language. For Supreme Court justices,
I included the term "argued" in my search, thus avoiding most opinions on
denial of certiorari, summary decisions, or other unusual opinions.
I solved the second problem by adding a search for "concurby (friendly)
and dissentby (friendly)", thus getting a separate count for that kind of
opinion. I used that count to eliminate double-counting in the totals for
overall opinions, concurrences, and dissents.
For the third problem, I did two things. First, I limited my search to
the file for the circuit to which the judge was appointed. This greatly limited
the chance of picking up opinions written by a Third Circuit Judge Higgin-
botham while looking for opinions written by a Fifth Circuit Judge Higgin-
botham. (It also had the advantage of removing out-of-circuit opinions,
where I suspected visiting judges might be less likely to write separately.)
I also began looking in citation format at the beginning and end of the cases
my search uncovered. If there the differences in the dates of the opinions
seemed suspiciously large, I would look at the opinions in full text to see if
they were written by different judges with the same last name. If so, I
would determine where in the list of citations the judges changed. I never
did uncover a good solution to the problem of two judges with the same last
name serving in the same circuit at the same time. The solution I chose was
to exclude such judges, thus eliminating, among others, the Judges Arnold,
Ginsburg, Hand, and Nelson from consideration.
Tables 18 and 19 were frustrating. I wanted to get a sense of both the
use of separate opinions by prominent judges and of their use across entire
circuits. I thought I could do this by using the "5Cir" file, for example, for
Fifth Circuit cases, and searching "date is 1965 and dissentby", thus getting
the total number of dissents published that year in the Fifth Circuit. I would
then repeat the process for the other kinds of opinions for as many circuits
and as many years (or spans of years) as I chose.
I learned, though, that I could not search for the words "writtenby",
"opinionby", "concurby", or "dissentby". Although they appear in the Lexis
report of the case, they seem not to be searchable. Nor would Lexis allow
me to search for "writtenby (!)", with "!" as its universal symbol. My
research assistant also tried to find a way to do the search, on Lexis and on
Westlaw. We finally gave up and she searched for separate opinions in all
opinions published, by the Fifth Circuit, and by all circuits, during the
month of April for each of eight sample years.
Tables 20 through 23 are founded on the full text case files of Wisdom
opinions, with the addition of some full text Fifth Circuit and All-Circuit
sample case files. Those files contained the full text of all opinions in cases
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where Judge Wisdom wrote an opinion, majority or separate. I went
through eight of the year-long full text case files one at a time and tempo-
rarily removed all Wisdom separate opinions, all non-Wisdom majority
opinions, all separate opinions to Wisdom opinions, and all non-appellate
opinions. I then ran a "word count" routine on the remainder of the file and
recorded the result. Unfortunately, this is not an exact word count of the
opinion as it would appear in F.2d or F.3d. It includes the full caption
information, plus Lexis-generated additions - the headers at each Lexis
screen and the page notations in the "[***]" format. I estimated that these
added, on average, about 100 words for the caption information and about
20 words per screen. As the same additions existed for all my files, this
should not make a difference in my comparisons, but it does mean that my
word estimates are about 10% too high.
Once I had done that for the Wisdom opinions, I still needed other
opinions for comparison. I then created some samples, to compare the
length of Judge Wisdom's opinions to those of other Fifth Circuit judges
and, in case the Fifth Circuit were unusual, to those of judges from all other
circuits. I did a date sensitive search in both the "USApp" and the "5Cir"
files, seeking a result that gave me about 30 published opinions. The search
would vary with the library and the year. For more recent years, I was able
to get more than 30 published opinions from the "USApp" file by searching
for opinions released on just one day. For the early sample years in the
Fifth Circuit, I had to search something like "date is aft April 30, 1960 and
date is bef May 17, 1960." I wanted to use all the opinions from a time
period in order to limit the risk that opinions delivered in the same period
were ordered in some way that would bias my count. After downloading
these files, I deleted separate opinions from them and ran the same word
count routine. A larger number of opinions in the samples might have been
preferable, but both downloading the full text files and cleaning them of
separate opinions was very time consuming.
I did the footnote count while preparing the full text files for the word
count. I would look for the last footnote number in each majority opinion
as I scrolled through the file. I recorded these numbers and totaled them for
each file. When opinions had a single note, denoted by an asterisk, I
counted that as one footnote.
Tables 24 through 30 are based on downloaded information from the
electronic version of Shepard's Citations, which I used through my Lexis
software. I entered the citations for each of the more than 1,200 Wisdom
majority appellate decisions and downloaded, in "full text" format, the
resulting list of citations. I also created comparison samples of citations to
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arbitrarily selected Fifth Circuit and all-circuit majority opinions in the same
manner. I did not use the cases from the earlier samples because I wanted
different years - years in the middle of the five year periods I was working
with rather than at the ends - and because I had not preserved the citations
to the early sample cases in a way that would be easy to enter.
There is little discretion in how to do the Shepard's search, but there are
some questions about how to tally the results. Shepard's is not a perfect tool
for this kind of search for several reasons.
First, Shepard's does not distinguish between citations to majority
opinions and separate opinions. That makes it useless for testing the influ-
ence of dissenting opinions, for example.
Second, it lists the times a case has been cited, not the cases in which
a case has been cited. If a citing opinion cites the source opinion four times,
that gets four separate listings in Shepard's. If the citations are close to-
gether, there is no way to be certain whether they are from one case or
several cases published near each other.
Third, it provides, and counts, redundant citations to some courts. Any
case where certiorari was sought would have at least three citations: U.S.
Reports, Supreme Court Reporter, and Lawyer's Edition. For some state
courts, but not all, Lexis would give both a regional reporter and an official
state citation.
Fourth, it does not provide dates for the citations. This makes it more
difficult to analyze When a case is being cited. It would not be difficult to
establish a rough dateline for the Federal Reporter and the Federal Supple-
ment; determining the dates of all the possible law review, annotation, and
state reporter citations would not be easy.
Fifth, Shepard's in its Lexis format does number its citations, which
usefully allows one to avoid actually counting the citations. However, its
numbering system is intended to give users a short cut to the cited source
and so the only citations with numbers are those that are found in Lexis.
What sources can be found in Lexis changes over time. This was particu-
larly noticeable with law reviews, most of which are now entered in Lexis,
but very few of which have their older volumes in Lexis. If the "unnum-
bered" citations came in the middle of the list of citations, the numbers
would usually, but not always, take them into account. For example, the
citations might go to number 11, then have two unnumbered law review
articles, and then end with an ALR annotation that was given number 14.
If, however, the last citations are to sources not in Lexis, the last number
will not be at the end of the list of citations.
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These disadvantages were not trivial, but Shepard's was more useful
than the alternative I explored - the Lexis "Lexcite" option. Lexcite effec-
tively ran a search of the engaged Lexis file for the citation. It found the
cases containing that citation, thus avoiding some of the double-counting
problems and providing the dates for the citing sources. On the other hand,
it produced this information in full-scale Lexis cite format. The same twenty
citations that would take one screen in Shepard's would take five in Lexcite,
with a concomitant increase in downloading time. The Lexcite results also
depend on the library being used. A Lexcite search in the "Genfed" library
would not produce any state court or law review citations. Finally, Lexcite
lacks the signals Shepard's gives about how the citation was used, whether
the citing case is the same case or a related case, and so on.
After some fruitless experiments, I stayed with Shepard's. I turned the
downloaded citations into one file for each year of cases. I then looked
through the citations to each case and recorded the number of total citations,
based on the last number in the citation list, and the number of citations from
within the circuit for which the opinion was written (usually the Fifth Cir-
cuit). I added "same case" or "related case" citations to the "within circuit"
total, although those citations come at the beginning of the listing. I did not
seek to correct for the treble counting of Supreme Court citations or the
double counting of some state citations. I did limit my citation count to only
Shepard's Federal Citations. Thus, citations to some sources that appear in
other Shepard's units, such as the Labor Law Citations, are not included in
my count.

